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GONE BROKE: 
SOVEREIGN DEBT, PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY, AND A 
COMPREHENSIVE CONTRACTUAL SOLUTION 
ADAM BRENNEMAN†
 
To the extent that bankruptcy theory attempts to justify bankruptcy 
law from any point in time after a party becomes a creditor of a 
firm, it begins the inquiry in the wrong place.1
 
Both sovereign debt and defaults have appeared frequently in the 
news over the past few years.2  However, the issue of sovereign debt re-
structuring is far from new.  Restructurings have occurred as far back 
as the sixteenth century.  Between 1557 and 1647, six debt crises in 
Spain were resolved using two of the same techniques discussed in 
modern restructurings:  rescheduling principal payments and reduc-
 † J.D. Candidate, University of Pennsylvania, 2006.  Thanks to Professors Friedrich 
Kübler and David Skeel, Michel Kerf, and Valerie Figueredo for their helpful com-
ments.  This paper is dedicated to my parents and to Sol, Fede, Damian, Atilio, and all 
my other friends in Argentina who introduced me to the country that revealed the true 
consequences of sovereign default.  All errors are my own. 
1 Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor’s Choice:  A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 
TEX. L. REV. 51, 56 (1992). 
2 See, e.g., Richard Morin & Claudia Deane, The Ideas Industry:  AIDS Takes Toll on 
African Militaries, WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 2003, at A21 (noting that a prominent American 
academic had been invited to France to hammer out differences over a “sovereign debt 
restructuring mechanism” proposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF)); 
Kenneth Rogoff, The Sisters at 60, ECONOMIST, July 24, 2004, at 63, 65 (“If the global 
community can work its way towards an improved bankruptcy procedure for sovereign 
borrowers, this path will be far easier.”); Jeffrey D. Sachs, Memorandum:  How to Run the 
International Monetary Fund, FOREIGN POL’Y, July/Aug. 2004, at 60, 63 (noting that 
“[t]he debt of emerging-market economies” will be an important issue for future lead-
ers of the IMF); Ernesto Zedillo, Resilience Is Not Forever, FORBES, Nov. 15, 2004, at 45, 
45 (discussing economic shocks and sovereign defaults). 
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ing interest rates.3  Proposals of mechanisms to help sovereigns deal 
with defaults have been made as early as 1976.4  Throughout the long 
discussion on how to help countries restructure their debt, most 
commentators have analyzed corporations undergoing bankruptcy 
and have compared them to countries in default to provide the basis 
of a model for sovereigns.5   
This Comment argues that the corporate analogy is incomplete.6  
The analogy between personal and sovereign bankruptcy may provide 
additional insight:  a sovereign and its needs in default have, in many 
ways, more in common with a person who has fallen into bankruptcy 
than a corporation that has done so.  Part I elaborates on the person-
sovereign analogy to find that three common challenges face the in-
solvent person and sovereign in the absence of bankruptcy laws:  
creditor holdout, moral hazard, and lack of coordination.  Part II ex-
amines existing proposals for sovereign debt restructuring—the In-
ternational Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
Mechanism (SDRM) and the inclusion of collective action clauses in 
bonds—to see if these challenges are addressed, and ultimately con-
cludes that the existing proposals fall short.  Part III proposes a con-
tractual solution called a Designer Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
Mechanism (DSDRM), which would allow each debtor country to con-
tract for its own insolvency and debt restructuring procedures.  This 
3 See ROSS P. BUCKLEY, EMERGING MARKETS DEBT:  AN ANALYSIS OF THE SECONDARY 
MARKET 6 (1999) (discussing the Spanish debt crises of 1557, 1575, 1596, 1607, 1627, 
and 1647). 
4 See Kenneth Rogoff & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Bankruptcy Procedures for Sovereigns:  A 
History of Ideas, 1976-2001, 49 IMF STAFF PAPERS 470, 472 n.4 (2002) (recognizing 
Göran Ohlin, Debts, Development and Default, in A WORLD DIVIDED:  THE LESS DEVEL-
OPED COUNTRIES IN THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 207, 221 (G.K. Helleiner ed., 
1976), for identifying the need for “something like the institution of ‘honourable 
bankruptcy’” to resolve sovereign debt crises). 
5 See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, Vultures or Vanguards?:  The Role of 
Litigation in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 1043, 1048 (2004) (arguing that 
sovereigns resemble corporations in many ways); Daniel K. Tarullo, Neither Order Nor 
Chaos:  The Legal Structure of Sovereign Debt Workouts, 53 EMORY L.J. 657, 669-70 (2004) 
(explaining that many authors have analyzed the similarities between corporations and 
sovereigns); Jonathan Sedlak, Comment, Sovereign Debt Restructuring:  Statutory Reform or 
Contractual Solution?, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1483, 1487-89 (2004) (examining the differ-
ences between a sovereign and a corporate debtor).  But see Robert K. Rasmussen, Inte-
grating a Theory of the State into Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 1159, 1179-85 
(2004) (arguing that individual bankruptcy has implications for sovereign debt restruc-
turing). 
6 Accord Anna Gelpern, Building a Better Seating Chart for Sovereign Restructurings, 53 
EMORY L.J. 1115, 1122 (2004) (“Many commentators have written that the firm-state 
analogy is deeply flawed.”). 
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Comment concludes by considering which options might be included 
in a DSDRM and how the DSDRM could be implemented. 
I.  WHAT IS THE PROBLEM WITH SOVEREIGN DEBT? 
More often than not, commentators trying to find solutions to the 
problems associated with sovereign debt restructuring analogize a sov-
ereign undergoing default to corporate bankruptcy.7  The appeal of 
such an analogy is not entirely unexpected; both corporations and 
sovereigns are sophisticated, complex entities in terms of their ability 
to raise debt.8  However, in many ways, the concept of personal bank-
ruptcy bears a greater resemblance to a sovereign in the throes of de-
fault than corporate bankruptcy does.  A comparison of sovereign in-
solvency to the bankruptcy of a hypothetical person may shine some 
light on the issue. 
A.  Personal Bankruptcy and Sovereign Default:   
Some Similarities Between Fred and a Developing Country 
Imagine a hypothetical person, Fred Argent, living in a hypotheti-
cal state, Valeria, that enforces debt contracts.  Fred is a widower and 
7 See supra note 5 and accompanying text (giving examples of articles focusing on 
the analogy between corporate bankruptcy and sovereign debt restructuring). 
8 Large corporations have long been considered sophisticated actors.  See United 
States v. Lachman, 387 F.3d 42, 56-57 (1st Cir. 2004) (noting that statutes are often 
addressed toward sophisticated parties like corporations); Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Remis 
Indus., Inc., 494 F.2d 196, 199 (2d Cir. 1974) (citing evidence that corporations are 
“amply sophisticated” and able to utilize credit in an “‘informed’ manner”); David B. 
Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799, 816-17 (1992) (arguing 
that corporations tend to continually interact with lawyers and thus are sophisticated 
users that can evaluate lawyers’ performance).  Sovereigns have also become increas-
ingly sophisticated due to access to the experienced counsel and debt instruments tra-
ditionally used by corporations.  See Becky L. Jacobs, Pesification and Economic Crisis in 
Argentina:  The Moral Hazard Posed by a Politicized Supreme Court, 34 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. 
L. REV. 391, 400 n.63 (2003) (noting that sovereigns are now able to access debt mar-
kets with sophisticated instruments); see also infra note 200 and accompanying text 
(noting that most sovereigns are represented by large New York City law firms experi-
enced in capital markets transactions); cf. Katharine Florey, Comment, Insufficiently 
Jurisdictional:  The Case Against Treating State Sovereign Immunity as an Article III Doctrine, 
92 CAL. L. REV. 1375, 1433 (2004) (“[A] state waiving state sovereign immunity is likely 
to receive comprehensive and sophisticated legal advice . . . .”).  Indeed, sometimes 
corporations and sovereigns are lumped together as “sophisticated parties.”  See Henry 
T.C. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives:  The Causes of Informational Failure and the Promise of 
Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457, 1465 (1993) (reviewing PETER L. BERN-
STEIN, THE IMPROBABLE ORIGINS OF MODERN WALL STREET (1992)) (noting that both 
corporations and sovereigns are sufficiently sophisticated to access certain types of 
debt markets). 
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has five children.  Fred rents a modest house and the children all 
share beds and have but one toy to share among them.  The cost of 
supporting Fred’s family’s basic needs–-heat, water, food, education, 
and clothing–-is $20,000 per year.  Fred works at a local restaurant as a 
waiter and is paid a salary of $23,500, just slightly more than his total 
expenses.  Although he can pay his bills, Fred wants to provide a bet-
ter life for his children (and for himself).  He notices that there are 
many jobs in his community paying $30,000 for people with one-year 
college degrees, so Fred decides to study at a community college.  
Fred takes out a loan from the bank for $4500 to pay for tuition, 
charges $400 on his credit card to pay for books, and the school ar-
ranges for ten of his classmates to lend him $10 each ($100 total) for a 
bus pass.  Thus, the total cost of his education is $5000.  Assume that 
there is a 75% probability that he will repay all creditors in full, and 
there is a 25% probability that after one year, he will only have $3500 
for his creditors.  To account for the risk, his creditors charge him an 
interest rate of 10%.9  All of the loans are due for repayment one year 
after he graduates.  Thus, at repayment, Fred will owe $5500.  How-
ever, since Fred expects to be earning $30,000 a year, his living costs 
($20,000) plus repayment of the loan ($5500) will leave him with 
$4500 to buy toys, books, and beds for his kids. 
This situation can be analogized to the situation of a typical devel-
oping country.  Developing countries often need to finance significant 
amounts of investment to foster the level of economic and social de-
velopment they desire, just as Fred needs to finance his investment in 
education to earn a higher salary and provide a better life for his kids.  
According to the World Bank, significant investments in infrastruc-
ture, education, health, legal development, and other areas are 
9 If there is a 75% chance that Fred will repay the full amount of the loan and a 
25% chance that he will repay $3500, then the bank must charge Fred $5500 to recoup 
the full value of $5000.  The bank calculates the amount it must charge Fred by deter-
mining three figures:  the amount of the loan (l ) ; the amount the bank expects to re-
ceive from Fred if he repays his loan in full (p), multiplied by the probability of full 
repayment (q); and the amount the bank expects to receive from Fred if he defaults 
(x), multiplied by the probability of default (y).  Thus, l must equal (p × q) + (x × y).  
Given that the amount of the loan is $5000, the probability of repayment is 75%, the 
probability of default is 25%, and the amount of default repayment is $3500, the calcu-
lation appears: 
  $5000 = (p × .75) + ($3500 × .25) 
  $5000 = .75p + $875 
  $4125 = .75p 
           p = $5500 
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needed in order to close the “poverty gap.”10  However, with a few ex-
ceptions, developing countries are unable to finance these invest-
ments using domestic funds, just as Fred is unable to pay for college 
out of his own pocket.  Savings rates are often low in such countries, 
and export revenue is usually insufficient to meet financing needs.11  
Often, tax receipts do not cover budgetary outlays.12  While “official 
development assistance” from the World Bank and other bilateral and 
multilateral entities cover some of these needs, “this source of re-
sources has been shrinking for many years.”13  As a result, developing 
countries often look to the private sector to finance budget support 
and new programs.14
Creditors are likely to lend to Fred because he is a good invest-
ment; that is, he is likely to pay the loan back.  Fred generally has a 
10 See generally WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2004:  MAKING SER-
VICES WORK FOR POOR PEOPLE (2003), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org (Re-
port No. 26895) (positing that a substantial increase in external resources in develop-
ing countries will be needed to increase the pace of human and economic 
development). 
11 See, e.g., César Calderón et al., Determinants of Current Account Deficits in Developing 
Countries 28 tbl.2 (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 2398, 2000), avail-
able at http://econ.worldbank.org/files/wps2398.pdf (noting that the mean private 
savings rate in heavily indebted poor countries was just 13% of gross national dispos-
able income). 
12 See, e.g., Derek Huang Chiat Chen, Intertemporal Excess Burden, Bequest Motives, 
and the Budget Deficit 48 fig.2.1  (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 3086, 
2003), available at http://econ.worldbank.org/files/wps3086.pdf (examining the his-
tory of budgets in developed and developing countries and finding that tax income 
rarely covered expenditures from 1953 to 1999).  In addition, international funds also 
appeal to many countries given that external borrowing creates lower levels of inflation 
than domestic borrowing, because the money supplied is usually not in the home 
country’s currency.  See Philippe Beaugrand et al., The Choice Between External and Do-
mestic Debt in Financing Budget Deficits:  The Case of Central and West African Countries 9 
(Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/02/79, 2002), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2002/wp0279.pdf (noting that external 
financing often appears attractive because of the reduced risks of inflationary pres-
sures).  Furthermore, external borrowing means that domestic funds can be channeled 
toward private investment rather than government priorities.  See id. (“If the exchange 
rate and interest rates are subject to government control, resorting to domestic financ-
ing has a more direct crowding-out effect on private investment by reducing the 
amount of credit available to the private sector . . . .”). 
13 Inaamul Haque & Ruxandra Burdescu, Monterrey Consensus on Financing for De-
velopment:  Response Sought from International Economic Law, 27 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. 
REV. 219, 246 (2004). 
14 See id. at 245 (“Developing countries see securing and sustaining private cash 
flows as imperative if they expect ‘to emerge from the poverty trap and to catch up 
with the richer countries . . . .’” (quoting Intergovernmental Group of Twenty-Four on 
Int’l Monetary Affairs & Dev., Report on the G-24 Workshop on Financing for Devel-
opment 6 (Sept. 6-7, 2001), available at http://www.g24.org/ICFDRep.pdf)). 
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sense of obligation to repay his debts, and he is unlikely to stray from 
this conviction.  As such, default on a loan is likely to be a traumatic 
emotional experience for Fred and will probably do serious injury to 
his reputation.15  Furthermore, defaulting on his loan is likely to im-
pair Fred’s credit rating and his ability to borrow in the future.16  Ac-
cordingly, he is unlikely to default on the loan unless necessary.  
Likewise, sovereigns “try hard” to repay their debt obligations.17  A 
government is also likely to consider reputational risk and the atten-
dant consequences when deciding whether to comply with its finan-
cial obligations.18  Outright repudiations of debt are rare, if for no 
other reason than sovereigns need continual access to credit markets, 
access that a default is likely to eliminate.19  Furthermore, defaulting 
on debt may cause other problems for a sovereign and its economy, 
particularly with respect to international trade.20  Regardless of 
whether one believes in the reputation theory of sovereign debt21 or 
the enforcement theory of sovereign debt,22 the sanctions imposed on 
15 Cf. Lisa J. McIntyre, A Sociological Perspective on Bankruptcy, 65 IND. L.J. 123, 129 
(1989) (suggesting that there are two predictors of bankruptcy: “‘moral conviction’ 
(commitment to keep promises) and ‘social pressure’ (fear of being stigmatized)”). 
16 William C. Whitford, The Ideal of Individualized Justice:  Consumer Bankruptcy as 
Consumer Protection, and Consumer Protection in Consumer Bankruptcy, 68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 
397, 401 (1994) (“A discharge harms the debtor’s credit rating and can make future 
borrowing difficult or more expensive.”). 
17 See William W. Bratton & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Debt Reform and the Best Interest 
of Creditors, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1, 12 (2004) (“[S]overeigns rarely repudiate their debt 
contracts in whole.”). 
18 See Harold L. Cole & Patrick J. Kehoe, Models of Sovereign Debt:  Partial Versus Gen-
eral Reputations, 39 INT’L ECON. REV. 55, 56 (1998) (“[I]f a government is viewed as un-
trustworthy in one relationship, th[e] government will be viewed as untrustworthy in 
other relationships.”); Avner Greif, Impersonal Exchange Without Impartial Law:  The 
Community Responsibility System, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 109, 138 (2004) (finding that collective 
responsibility and reputation play a role in encouraging sovereigns to pay debts). 
19 See, e.g., Bratton & Gulati, supra note 17, at 13 (noting that the need to obtain 
future credit tends to deter countries from defaulting); Rory Macmillan, The Next Sover-
eign Debt Crisis, 31 STAN. J. INT’L L. 305, 335 (1995) (“[T]he perception remains strong 
that reneging on debt obligations endangers a country’s creditworthiness and credibil-
ity.”). 
20 See Marcel Fafchamps, Sovereign Debt, Structural Adjustment, and Conditionality, 50 
J. DEV. ECON. 313, 316 (1996) (noting that sovereigns who default on debt may have to 
structure their trade through “smoke and mirrors” deals). 
21 See Bratton & Gulati, supra note 17, at 14 (defining the reputation theory of sov-
ereign default as one where the primary cost of default is “exclusion from future bor-
rowing”). 
22 See id. at 15-16 (defining the enforcement theory of sovereign default as one 
where additional, nonreputation sanctions are needed to deter debtor countries from 
defaulting). 
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a defaulting nation are usually sufficiently severe to deter defaults that 
are entirely opportunistic.23
Now imagine that Fred’s 25% risk comes to fruition and some-
thing goes wrong with his plan.  Perhaps Fred gets sick, and is unable 
to work for a few months.  Maybe Fred misunderstood the job adver-
tisements and needed to study something different for the job he 
seeks.  It could be that the jobs Fred seeks do not pay the rate Fred 
expected or that they materialize and disappear after a few months.  
Conceivably, Fred could spend his book money on beer and fail to 
graduate, becoming ineligible for a higher paying job.  Perhaps the 
other students in Fred’s class use their loans improperly and creditors 
think that Fred poses a similar risk, in which case creditors raise inter-
est rates to cover the losses.  In any of these situations, one can imag-
ine that Fred will no longer be able to make his loan payments in full. 
Fred’s potential personal crisis parallels the financial crises en-
dured by developing countries.  Just as Fred may have chosen to study 
the wrong subject to obtain a new job, a financial crisis might occur in 
the sovereign context because a country has implemented the wrong 
economic policies to increase growth.24  For example, overvalued ex-
change rates, unsustainable budgets, anti-export trade regimes, and 
other domestic policies may have led to the defaults of Latin Ameri-
can governments on bank loans during the 1980s.25  Modern devalua-
tions in exchange rates have also led to problems with servicing sover-
eign debt.26  Much like Fred’s job might not pay the wage he 
23 For a discussion of opportunistic default, see infra text accompanying notes 33-
40. 
24 See, e.g., Guillermo Perry & Luis Servén, The Anatomy of a Multiple Crisis:  Why Was 
Argentina Special and What Can We Learn From It? 28-41 (World Bank, Policy Research 
Working Paper No. 3081, 2003), available at http://econ.worldbank.org/files/wps3081.pdf 
(discussing Argentine policies that led to the country’s financial crisis and resulting 
default); cf. Frederic S. Mishkin, Financial Policies and the Prevention of Financial Crises in 
Emerging Market Countries 13 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
8087, 2001), available at http://papers.nber.org/papers/w8087.pdf (listing twelve 
categories of policies that countries can undertake to avoid defaulting on their loan 
obligations). 
25 See BUCKLEY, supra note 3, at 19-20 (identifying internal factors which led to sov-
ereign defaults in the 1980s). 
26 See, e.g., Harald Sander & Stefanie Kleimeier, Contagion and Causality:  An Em-
pirical Investigation of Four Asian Crisis Episodes, 13 J. INT’L FIN. MARKETS INSTITUTIONS & 
MONEY 171, 171-72 (2003) (reviewing the causes of East Asian financial crises leading 
to default); Augusto de la Torre et al., Living and Dying with Hard Pegs:  The Rise and Fall 
of Argentina’s Currency Board, ECONOMIA, Spring 2003, at 43, 64-72 (discussing the crisis 
in Argentina in which fears of devaluation led to a hard currency shortage, in turn re-
sulting in default); see also Richard Euliss, Comment, The Feasibility of the IMF’s Sovereign 
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previously believed it would pay, ill-conceived projects in which devel-
oping countries invest the proceeds of external financing often fail to 
produce the increased revenue expected of them.27  Just as Fred might 
misdirect part of his loan proceeds towards non-educational expenses, 
developing countries may face problems with corrupt leaders and the 
misdirection of loan proceeds.28  The literature on domestic policies 
that may lead to the creation of economic crisis is far too broad to ex-
plore in this Comment, but it suffices to say that an economic crisis 
may be a country’s own doing. 
Other times, exogenous circumstances may cause a crisis.  Just as 
Fred might get sick, developing countries may endure natural disas-
ters that dampen economic output.29  Just as a financial crisis might 
prevent a future employer from hiring Fred, a sovereign’s policies may 
meet some initial success, but external circumstances can lead to poor 
results.30  Still other times, debtor countries suffer from contagion of 
crises from other countries.  Just as Fred’s classmates’ malfeasance 
Debt Restructuring Mechanism:  An Alternative Statutory Approach To Mollify American Reser-
vations, 19 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 107, 116 (2003) (finding that the risk of dramatic 
growth in debt burden and default increases during hard currency shortages). 
27 See William Easterly, Growth Implosions, Debt Explosions, and My Aunt Marilyn:  Do 
Growth Slowdowns Cause Public Debt Crises? 5 (World Bank, Policy Research Working Pa-
per No. 2531, 2001), available at http://econ.worldbank.org/files/wps2531.pdf 
(“[P]olicy variables that make some countries slow down less or more than others do 
have fiscal consequences.”); Rodrigo Suescún, Raising Revenue with Transaction Taxes in 
Latin America:  Or Is It Better to Tax with the Devil You Know? 24 (World Bank, Policy Re-
search Working Paper No. 3279, 2004), available at http://econ.worldbank.org/ 
files/wps3279.pdf (arguing that temporary, rather than permanent, imposition of a 
transaction tax is likely to raise more revenue). 
28 See BUCKLEY, supra note 3, at 20-21 (arguing that corruption was a principal rea-
son why Latin American sovereigns had difficulty repaying petro-dollar loans); see, e.g., 
Raymond Fisman & Jakob Svensson, Are Corruption and Taxation Really Harmful to 
Growth?  Firm-Level Evidence 3 (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 2485, 
2000), available at http://econ.worldbank.org/files/wps2485.pdf (concluding that cor-
ruption is more harmful to growth in Uganda than is taxation); see also Stijn Claessens 
et al., Resolving Systemic Financial Crises:  Policies and Institutions 13 (World Bank,  
Policy Research Working Paper No. 3377, 2004), available at http://econ. 
worldbank.org/files/wps3377.pdf (suggesting that corruption leads to systemic bank-
ing crises). 
29 See, e.g., Henry F. Jackson, The African Crisis:  Drought and Debt, 63 FOREIGN AFF. 
1081, 1083 (1985) (observing that drought in Africa caused many countries to draw 
heavily on their foreign currency reserves to purchase food abroad). 
30 For example, if a country were to invest in exploiting a natural resource com-
modity, and the price of that commodity unexpectedly fell, the investment would turn 
out to be unprofitable.  See, e.g., Angus Deaton, Commodity Prices and Growth in Africa, J. 
ECON. PERSP., Summer 1999, at 23, 31 (arguing that some well-intentioned investments 
in natural resource and commodity exploitation have been unsuccessful because of 
commodity price fluctuations). 
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might lead to higher interest rates for Fred, investor panic resulting 
from economic crises in neighboring countries might lead to regional 
capital flight, regardless of an individual country’s policies.  Such 
“herd behavior” on the part of investors is thought to result from a 
combination of high trading volatility and information deficits.31  The 
result is that yield spreads—the cost of servicing debt—“do not only 
capture country-specific information but also relate to spillovers from 
developments in one particular country.”32  In these cases, a debtor 
country may be unable to repay its debt through no fault of its own. 
One of the key differences between corporate default and con-
sumer default is in the concept of opportunistic default.  Some might 
argue that Fred is opportunistically defaulting because technically he 
could pay back the entirety of his debt:  he has an income of $23,500 
in the default state and only owes $5000.  However, Fred’s minimum 
expenses are $20,000, meaning that he can pay at most $3500 
($23,500 - $20,000 = $3500) without sacrificing food or shelter.  One 
could argue that Fred is opportunistically defaulting because he could 
simply stop feeding and clothing his children or elect to go homeless 
to make up the additional $1500.  Perhaps one could even suggest 
that Fred reduce his diet to a few cups of rice–-just enough to survive 
on.  The same logic is often applied to corporations, which are asked 
to close parts of their businesses or reduce operations in order to con-
tinue paying creditors.33
These options, while perhaps plausible for a corporation, are not 
plausible for a person.  Fred must eat, must be clothed, and if he 
wants to live a reasonable life, must be sheltered.  Even if Fred did 
own a house or a car, it might not be in his best interests to sell it.  For 
instance, Fred might need a car to earn the amount of income neces-
31 See, e.g., Luca Barbone & Lorenzo Forni, Are Markets Learning?  Behavior in the 
Secondary Market for Brady Bonds 34 (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 
1734, 1997), available at http://econ.worldbank.org/files/wps1734.pdf (suggesting 
that the behavior of Brady Bond traders “responds to the level of uncertainty in the 
market”). 
32 Norbert Fiess, Capital Flows, Country Risk, and Contagion 3 (World Bank, Policy 
Research Working Paper No. 2943, 2003), available at http://econ.worldbank.org/ 
files/wps2943.pdf. 
33 See, e.g., Mark Belko, Airline to End Europe Flights:  US Airways’ Decision Leaves Re-
gion Without a Nonstop to Continent, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Aug. 13, 2004, at A1 
(reporting that US Airways had decided to cut its flight schedules from Pittsburgh, its 
once-largest hub, as part of a restructuring plan); Constance L. Hays, Retail Consultant 
Says Kmart Will Seek To Close 312 Stores, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2003, at C2 (discussing 
Kmart’s plans to close stores in order to reduce costs and pay creditors as part of a 
bankruptcy plan). 
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sary to sustain his family,34 and a home is necessary for shelter.35  In 
this sense, one could argue that Fred is opportunistically defaulting:  
he has the opportunity to pay back his debt, but the social costs of not 
feeding his children or providing himself with shelter are higher than 
the economic costs of default.  Fred, unlike a corporation, is not 
merely an “investment vehicle” for himself and his children.36
Likewise, a sovereign is not merely an investment vehicle for its 
citizens.  A sovereign makes decisions based not on returns to inves-
tors, but rather based on a complicated equation of politics, social 
conditions, and economics.37  As a result, a sovereign may opportunis-
tically default when it is “simply . . . unwilling to make the required 
payments.”38  For example, a debtor country whose economy is heavily 
dependent on commodity exports may decide to forego debt service 
when the price of the commodity drops.  This would allow the debtor 
country to divert funds intended for debt service to soften the domes-
tic economic blow of the decline in export revenues.39  While Fred 
would almost certainly default in his situation, the concept of a wholly 
strategic sovereign default has so far been limited to academic litera-
ture.40  However, while debtor countries almost always have the osten-
sible choice of defaulting or raising taxes and cutting popular social 
programs, “[s]o long as the sovereign has a choice as to whether or 
not to default, strategy inheres in the fact pattern.”41  Given the choice 
34 The Federal Bankruptcy Code recognizes that Fred’s car, valued up to a certain 
amount, will be necessary for a “fresh start,” and therefore allows him to keep it.  See 11 
U.S.C. § 522(d) (2000) (listing property, including an automobile for personal use, 
that is exempt from liquidation during bankruptcy proceedings). 
35 See Phyllis A. Klein, Note, “A Fresh Start with Someone Else’s Property”:  Lien Avoid-
ance, the Homestead Exemption and Divorce Property Divisions Under Section 522(f)(1) of the 
Bankruptcy Code, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 423, 429-30 (1990) (discussing the homestead 
exemption’s expansion to provide a debtor with a fresh start after bankruptcy). 
36 See Rasmussen, supra note 5, at 1163 (describing corporations as investment ve-
hicles in order to distinguish corporations and sovereigns). 
37 See Sedlak, supra note 5, at 1487-88 (explaining the factors entering a sover-
eign’s decision-making calculus with respect to the repayment of debt). 
38 Fisch & Gentile, supra note 5, at 1048. 
39 See id. at 1049 (giving an example in which a sovereign that is dependent upon 
export taxes for revenue might choose to default during a commodity price crisis so as 
“to ameliorate the effects of the shock in prices”). 
40 There is little evidence that any country has ever defaulted for entirely oppor-
tunistic reasons.  While most sovereigns will not default in good economic conditions, 
most will take into account political and social conditions in deciding when to default.  
See Bratton & Gulati, supra note 17, at 17 (“[A]lthough strategic defaults are a theoreti-
cal possibility, sovereigns as a practical matter only default under identifiably bad eco-
nomic conditions.”). 
41 Id. 
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between completely cutting social programs and default, sovereigns 
frequently find a partially opportunistic default the more palatable 
choice.42
To sum up, persons—e.g., Fred—and sovereigns default on loans 
for a very wide variety of reasons.  Unlike corporations, however, Fred 
and sovereigns will most likely default before they have liquidated all 
of their assets to repay their debt.  Thus, faced with the choice of star-
vation or default, Fred will probably stop repaying his creditors. 
B.  Options To Collect Debt:  An Analysis of Fred and the Sovereign 
The creditors that have lent to Fred and to a developing country 
are now faced with a dilemma:  how can they collect the money that 
they lent?  This question is difficult, and the answer may concern not 
only Fred or the developing country, but also their peers.  If creditors 
cannot easily collect any of the money they have lent to a debtor who 
defaults, they will charge an interest rate to reflect this, just as Fred 
was charged 10% interest based on the 25% risk that he would pay less 
than the full amount of the loan.43  For example, if creditors only had 
a 50% chance of collecting on Fred’s assets, his interest rate would rise 
to slightly over 20%.44  A country will be charged a similar risk pre-
mium for the possibility that the creditors will not be able to collect.  
A number of commentators have remarked that a high risk premium 
is one of the principal motivations to optimize the collection of sover-
eign debt.45  This is particularly true for sovereign lending where more 
efficient debt collection systems are likely to “ultimately reduce the fu-
ture cost of sovereign borrowing, because creditors would receive a 
higher recovery under such a system and this should cause them to 
42 See Sedlak, supra note 5, at 1488 (“[A] country will always reach a point beyond 
which the costs of servicing its debts exceed the costs of defaulting.”).  The cost of ser-
vicing a country’s debt is ostensibly a social cost. 
43 See Barry Adler et al., Regulating Consumer Bankruptcy:  A Theoretical Inquiry, 29 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 585, 608 (2000) (“When creditors can reach assets, their insolvency state 
payoffs increase, thereby inducing a fall in the interest rate.”). 
44 Using the figures from before, if Fred has a 25% chance of being able to pay 
$3500 in the default state, but his creditors have only a 50% chance of obtaining that 
amount because of potential obstacles to collection, the value of the default-state re-
payment would decrease to (0.25 × 0.5 × $3500 = $437.5).  Accordingly, the amount of 
money collected in the non-default state would have to rise to $6083 to make up the 
difference ((0.75 × $6083) + $437.5 = $5000).  Thus, interest rates would have to rise to 
20.83%. 
45 See Tarullo, supra note 5, at 661 (arguing that, “[a]s is regularly noted,” if sover-
eign debt workouts are too easy, the costs of capital for other debtor nations might 
rise). 
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decrease the cost of sovereign lending.”46  As Alan Schwartz argues, 
“the ultimate object of bankruptcy law is to help maximize social 
wealth.  This object implies the instrumental goal of minimizing the 
cost of debt capital.”47  Thus, it is necessary to examine the two ac-
cepted means of collecting debt:  liquidation and restructuring. 
1.  Liquidation of Assets 
Ostensibly, Fred’s creditors could ask Fred to sell—or, in the ter-
minology of bankruptcy, “liquidate”—some of his possessions in order 
to pay back his debt.48  If Fred’s creditors were particularly smart, they 
would have secured their loans with collateral, which would entitle 
them to take possession of the collateral and sell it after Fred’s de-
fault.49  However, in the hypothetical presented, the problem is obvi-
ous:  Fred has very few possessions.  He owns no car and he rents his 
home rather than owning it.  The meager food that Fred is able to 
purchase is unlikely to qualify as collateral, and would be difficult to 
“liquidate.”  A sovereign debtor typically presents the same problems.  
Sovereigns can rarely offer collateral in exchange for their loans.50  
Just as Fred’s creditors cannot simply “liquidate” him as a corporate 
creditor could a corporate debtor,51 a sovereign cannot be liquidated 
or sold off.  Unlike a corporate entity, which may have buildings, bank 
46 A. Mechele Dickerson, A Politically Viable Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 
53 EMORY L.J. 997, 1011-12 (2004); see also Alon Seveg, When Countries Go Bust:  Propos-
als for Debtor and Creditor Resolution, 3 ASPER REV. INT’L BUS. & TRADE L. 25, 26 (2003) 
(arguing that “lenders are forced to increase interest rates to cover potential losses” 
caused by defaults). 
47 Alan Schwartz, A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107 YALE L.J. 
1807, 1814 (1998). 
48 This option is analogous to Chapter 7 bankruptcy.  See 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-707, 
721-728 (2000) (setting forth the procedures for Chapter 7 liquidation of personal as-
sets); see also Michelle J. White, Why It Pays To File for Bankruptcy:  A Critical Look at the 
Incentives Under U.S. Personal Bankruptcy Law and a Proposal for Change, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 
685, 687-89 (1998) (explaining Chapter 7 bankruptcy procedure and exemptions). 
49 See U.C.C. § 9-610 (2000) (explaining the disposition of collateral in cases of 
default). 
50 See Patrick Bolton & David A. Skeel, Jr., Inside the Black Box:  How Should a Sover-
eign Bankruptcy Framework Be Structured?, 53 EMORY L.J. 763, 774 (2004) (“It is harder for 
sovereigns than for corporate debtors to offer collateral . . . , and enforcement is quite 
tricky when the debt does purport to provide security.”).  Sovereigns rarely have sig-
nificant assets outside of their own country.  See Bratton & Gulati, supra note 17, at 11 
(“And defaulting sovereigns try their best not to leave valuables lying around.”).  En-
forcement of security interests in domestic assets, whether physical or financial, is likely 
to be tricky.  See infra note 52 and accompanying text. 
51 See, e.g., Adler et al., supra note 43, at 586 (“The insolvent consumer cannot be 
liquidated . . . .”). 
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accounts, and other assets within the reach of domestic courts, exist-
ing courts would have no effective jurisdiction or enforcement power 
over a sovereign’s domestic assets.52
The inability to collateralize debt has not always been central to 
the understanding of sovereign lending.  Prior to the early twentieth 
century, sovereign debt was often “secured” by assets like tax receipts 
or land.  During the debt defaults of the 1910s, however, creditors 
found that they could not enforce their security interests without the 
aid of military or diplomatic initiatives by their governments.53  As a 
result, many of these debtors found their security interests to be of lit-
tle value in collecting on their debt.54  In more recent times, creditors 
have occasionally been able to secure loans with export revenues or 
foreign bank accounts.55  These situations, however, are few and far 
between.  The current understanding is that, “[u]nlike a defaulting 
corporate borrower, a sovereign cannot be liquidated.”56  Likewise, 
neither Fred nor a sovereign will have any “equity” to speak of.57  Ac-
cordingly, the only situation in which a creditor is likely to receive full 
repayment from either Fred or a sovereign is to allow their debts to be 
restructured. 
52 See Gelpern, supra note 6, at 1122 (“[E]ven today’s diminished view of sover-
eignty precludes outside control over debtors’ principal assets—national economies 
and government finances.”).  It is worth noting that, in theory, a sovereign’s own 
courts could order it to sell domestic assets to satisfy foreign debts.  However, a default-
ing sovereign’s political situation often makes it unlikely that creditors can depend on 
local courts.  See Bratton & Gulati, supra note 17, at 11 (“[T]he sovereign lender has no 
recourse to a reliable enforcement authority.”). 
53 See Kris James Mitchener & Marc D. Weidenmier, Supersanctions and Sovereign 
Debt Repayment 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11472, 2005), 
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w11472.pdf (finding that supersanctions, 
such as military intervention, were used as an effective means of sovereign debt collec-
tion during the 1910s). 
54 See Lee C. Buchheit & Jeremiah S. Pam, The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt 
Instruments, 53 EMORY L.J. 869, 898 (2004) (describing the evolution of “secured lend-
ing to sovereign borrowers”). 
55 See Gabrielle Lipworth & Jens Nystedt, Crisis Resolution and Private Sector Adapta-
tion, 47 IMF STAFF PAPERS 188, 192 (2001) (“Some debt instruments are collateralized 
with foreign assets and designed in such a way that should default occur, the recovery 
value is very high . . . .”). 
56 Bratton & Gulati, supra note 17, at 11; see also Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring:  A Bankruptcy Reorganization Approach, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 956, 971-72 
(2000) (arguing that criticism of Chapter 11 regarding inefficient choices of reorgani-
zation over liquidation is irrelevant to sovereign debt restructuring because a sovereign 
cannot be liquidated). 
57 See Bratton & Gulati, supra note 17, at 12 (arguing that the citizens of a debtor 
country are the closest thing to equity a debtor country has). 
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2.  Restructuring 
Fred and his family cannot be liquidated and have few existing as-
sets to seize, and he is still unable to pay the full amount of his debt:  
Fred can only pay $3500 of the $5000 he borrowed.  If his creditors 
want to collect the full amount of the debt, they will have to wait an-
other year;58 in other words, they will have to restructure his payment 
of principal and interest.  The same is true in the sovereign context.  
Since a sovereign’s creditors cannot liquidate or seize assets to satisfy 
the debt, they must wait until the sovereign has sufficient assets to sat-
isfy its obligations.  As one commentator argues: 
[W]hen a country cannot (or will not) pay all its creditors in full and on 
time, it serves the collective interest of all creditors to agree on a restruc-
turing where all might lose some value relative to the original promise, 
provided the debtor’s prospects of economic recovery go up and with it 
the repayment prospects of the restructured debt.
59
Although restructuring debt appears to be the only plausible 
means for Fred and the sovereign’s creditors to collect in full, this so-
lution is not without its own problems.  The next Subpart will discuss 
how creditor holdouts, moral hazard, and lack of coordination might 
impede an efficient restructuring. 
C.  Potential Pitfalls of Restructuring: 
Creditor Holdouts, Moral Hazard, and Lack of Coordination 
1.  Creditor Holdouts 
In the hypothetical, Fred has twelve creditors:  a bank, a credit 
card company, and ten individuals.  Each type of creditor has lent a 
different amount, and all want to be repaid.  Fred, in the default state, 
is able to pay $3500 in Year 1, which is 70% of the $5000 debt he ini-
tially incurred.  Assume there is no cooperation or communication 
among creditors, that each wants to be paid back as soon as possible, 
and that there is no regulatory scheme that assigns priority to credi-
tors.  Each creditor will then rush to court to sue for enforcement of 
its loan.  If the bank reaches the courthouse first, it will recover all of 
the $3500 to satisfy its $4500 loan, and no other party will be paid un-
58 Without depriving himself of the bare necessities of feeding, clothing, and shel-
tering himself and his family, Fred can pay a maximum of $3500 per year.  Thus, in the 
default state, in Year 1, Fred can pay $3500, and in Year 2, he will be able to repay the 
remaining $1500 of principal, plus accrued interest. 
59 Gelpern, supra note 6, at 1138. 
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til Year 2.  Alternatively, if the credit card company reaches the court-
house first, it will take $550 ($500 principal plus 10% interest) and 
will be paid in full, leaving $2950 to be allocated among the other 
creditors.  If an individual creditor reaches the courthouse first, she 
will be paid $11 ($10 principal plus 10% interest) and be paid in full, 
leaving $3489 for remaining creditors.  The problem here is that some 
creditors will receive more than other creditors simply because they 
arrived at the courthouse first. 
A sovereign faces the same problems in trying to obtain a restruc-
turing.  Individual creditors opting out of a restructuring may be able 
to enforce their claims in full, or at least sooner and for more than 
they would get by participating in the restructuring.  “[C]reditors have 
an incentive to collect debts promptly . . . rather than coordinate col-
lection efforts with other creditors.”60  The creditor holdout problem, 
however, poses a more serious conundrum for a sovereign:  while Fred 
has taken out just a few loans with a total of twelve creditors, a sover-
eign is likely to have many types of loans, such as syndicated bank 
loans, trade credit, and bond issues, with thousands of creditors.61  
Which creditors decide to collect and when they do may depend on 
the value and maturity of their respective claims.62  Collection upon 
default decreases the amount of money available to other creditors af-
ter a restructuring63 and increases uncertainty in the restructuring 
process.64  For example, creditors might seize the planes of state-run 
60 Schwartz, supra note 47, at 1840; see also Gelpern, supra note 6, at 1138-39 (“[A]n 
individual creditor that refuses to restructure stands to gain disproportionately from 
the others’ concessions.”). 
61 See Seveg, supra note 46, at 46 (“[T]he move from syndicated bank lending to 
bonds . . . has made coordination of creditors [in sovereign debt restructurings] much 
more difficult . . . .”); see also Vladimir Werning, JP Morgan, Argentina:  Roadmap for 
Restructuring:  What to Look for at Each Stage of the Process 7 (Oct. 8, 2004), available 
at http://www.cbonds.info/comments/materials/6990/arg1004.pdf (noting that Ar-
gentina has at least 152 separate bond issues). 
62 See Lipworth & Nystedt, supra note 55, at 202-03 (noting that longer-term credi-
tors may be unwilling to restructure if they believe the restructuring will benefit 
shorter-term creditors and that shorter-term creditors would not agree to a payment 
suspension unless the present value of a deal sweetener exceeds the value of short-term 
credit). 
63 See Bratton & Gulati, supra note 17, at 24-25 (noting that a bankruptcy system 
might create a surplus or at least prevent it from dissipating); cf. Schwartz, supra note 
47, at 1808 (arguing that “piecemeal liquidation” of a firm could result from prompt 
collection in an unregulated system, thus reducing funds available to the creditor pool 
as a whole). 
64 See John B. Taylor, Under Sec’y for Int’l Affairs, U.S. Treasury Dep’t, Remarks to 
the IMF Conference in Honor of Guillermo Calvo (Apr. 16, 2004), http://www.treas.gov/ 
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airlines that land in creditor states,65 or capture funds that are trans-
ferred through banks located in creditor states.66  The result is that 
“ruthful bondholders, however large their majority, are . . . at the 
mercy of their most ruthless colleagues.”67  This is called the “holdout 
litigation” or “grab race” problem, and the holdout creditors are 
known as “vulture funds.”68
Sovereigns have offered a variety of defenses designed to stave off 
holdout litigation.  Argentina, for example, argued that the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)69 created a defense against seizure 
of assets to satisfy creditor claims.70  The Supreme Court, however, 
found that issuance of debt—in particular, a bond—constitutes com-
mercial activity under the statute71 and thus falls within the FSIA’s ex-
ception to sovereign immunity.72
press/releases/js1473.htm (“[C]ollective action cases [a]re the more promising and 
feasible way to introduce more predictability into the system.”). 
65 See Bolton & Skeel, supra note 50, at 782 (“If [a] sovereign [that operated a 
state-run airline] defaulted, creditors could seek to attach the sovereign’s airplanes af-
ter they landed in a country that permitted such actions.”). 
66 Commentators have noted that under the pari passu clause in a bond contract, a 
vulture fund could attach sovereign funds traveling through the Euroclear system that 
were intended for other bondholders.  See, e.g., Buchheit & Pam, supra note 54, at 877-
79 & nn.16-19 (citing Ex parte Elliott Assocs., No. 2000/QR/92, slip op. (Brussels Ct. 
App., 8th Chamber, Sept. 26, 2000) (Belg.), as an example of a creditor trying to inter-
cept a Brady Bond payment). 
67 Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Bonds and the Collective Will, 51 
EMORY L.J. 1317, 1320 (2002).  In fact, this is one of the primary concerns of “the offi-
cial sector [, which] wants to ensure that private creditors do not escape by imposing 
losses they should bear onto others.”  Lipworth & Nystedt, supra note 55, at 190. 
68 See, e.g., Fisch & Gentile, supra note 5, at 1098 (“[H]oldout litigation may pro-
vide a means of avoiding the failures . . . by allowing creditors to enforce their claims 
against sovereign debtors.”); Bratton & Gulati, supra note 17, at 21-22 (noting that 
“[i]nstitutional bondholders known as ‘vulture funds’ specialize in” purchasing dis-
tressed debt at a substantial discount and then decline to participate in an exchange 
offer). 
69 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1605 (2000). 
70 See Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 615-17 (1992) (noting 
Argentina’s argument that in issuing bonds it was acting as a sovereign, not as a com-
mercial entity, and that it should therefore be immune from suit). 
71 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2000) (providing an exception to sovereign immu-
nity for suits based upon a sovereign’s commercial activities that have a “direct effect” 
in the United States). 
72 See Weltover, 504 U.S. at 614 (“[W]hen a foreign government acts . . . in the 
manner of a private player within [a market], the foreign sovereign’s actions are 
‘commercial’ within the meaning of the FSIA.”); see also Conn. Bank of Commerce v. 
Republic of Congo, 309 F.3d 240, 260-61 (5th Cir. 2002) (suggesting that oil and tax 
revenues may be commercial activity under the FSIA); Avi Lew, Note, Republic Of Ar-
gentina v. Weltover, Inc.:  Interpreting the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act’s Commercial Ac-
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Peru, in one effort to stave off holdout litigation, asserted the de-
fense of comity73 against a debt collection effort by Pravin Banker As-
sociates.74  Pravin Banker Associates was a holdout creditor that re-
fused to participate in an ongoing restructuring of Peruvian sovereign 
debt and had sued for enforcement.75  Although the Second Circuit 
recognized the policy of U.S. courts to “ordinarily refuse to review acts 
of foreign governments and defer to proceedings taking place in for-
eign countries,” it held that comity would not prohibit the court from 
reviewing Peru’s decisions to restructure debts, including those involv-
ing Pravin.76  The court therefore denied Peru’s request to refuse to 
enforce Pravin’s debt claims.77  Judge Calabresi held that comity was 
not a requirement, but merely a “rule of practice, convenience, and 
expediency” that could be ignored if deferring to the foreign act 
would be contrary to U.S. policy.78  The Second Circuit agreed with 
Pravin that extending an indefinite stay on enforcement of sovereign 
debt would be contrary to U.S. policy, and thus enforced Pravin’s 
claim notwithstanding the Peruvian restructuring.79
Peru tried another tactic in Elliott Associates v. Banco de la Nacion.80  
Elliott Associates, a vulture fund, sued for enforcement on Peruvian 
debt that it had purchased.81  It allegedly acquired the debt specifi-
cally for the purpose of enforcing it in court, with the intent of ex-
tracting concessions from creditors in exchange for dropping its suit.82  
tivity Exception to Jurisdictional Immunity, 17 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 726, 741-42 (1994) (in-
terpreting Weltover to mean that bond reschedulings fall within the definition of 
“commercial activity” of the FSIA); cf. Allied Bank Int’l v. Banco Credito Agricola de 
Cartago, 757 F.2d 516, 522 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that when a foreign state takes 
property located in the United States, its actions are not exempt from U.S. jurisdiction 
under the “act of state” doctrine). 
73 Comity is a judicial policy that gives deference to acts of foreign jurisdictions.  
See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895) (stating that comity normally requires a 
court to enforce a foreign judgment). 
74 See Pravin Banker Assocs. v. Banco Popular del Peru, 109 F.3d 850, 854 (2d Cir. 
1997) (noting Peru’s argument that international comity prevents U.S. courts from 
exercising jurisdiction over disputes between Peru and its creditors). 
75 Id. at 850-51. 
76 Id. at 854-56. 
77 Id. at 856. 
78 Id. at 854-55 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
79 Id. at 855-56. 
80 194 F.3d 363 (2d Cir. 1999). 
81 Id. at 365-67. 
82 See id. at 368 (relying on the district court’s finding that “Elliott purchased the 
Peruvian debt with the intent and purpose to sue” (quoting Elliott Assocs. v. Republic 
of Peru, 12 F. Supp. 2d 328, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1998))). 
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Banco de la Nacion and Peru argued that New York champerty stat-
utes prohibited a party from purchasing debt for the purpose of bring-
ing a suit or proceeding thereon.83  The Second Circuit found that the 
champerty defense, like the comity defense, was without merit, and 
ultimately enforced Elliott Associates’ claim.84
One of the rare cases in which courts did grant a sovereign’s re-
quest to deny enforcement of its debt contracts is CIBC Bank & Trust 
Co. (Cayman) v. Banco Central do Brasil.85  In CIBC Bank, a creditor who 
had elected not to participate in a “Brady conversion”86 of bank loans 
to bonds tried to enforce an acceleration clause in the loan agree-
ment, which would have required the debtor to immediately repay the 
principal and remaining interest.87  However, Banco Central do Brasil 
retained $1.6 billion of the original debt, which gave it a majority in-
terest and allowed it to block any attempt to accelerate the loan.88  
Notwithstanding CIBC’s claims of tortious interference with the con-
tract, the court found that the terms of the loan agreement between 
CIBC and Banco Central do Brasil governed and that so long as Banco 
Central held a majority of the remaining debt, CIBC could not accel-
erate.89
In conclusion, courts have tended to side with vulture funds when 
sovereigns offer defenses to litigation intended to compel repayment.  
Holdout litigation will therefore continue to be a problem for sover-
eign debt restructurings unless a suitable solution is found. 
83 See id. at 367-69 (noting Peru’s reliance on N.Y. JUD. CT. ACTS LAW § 489 
(McKinney 1983), to support its position that the court should not entertain Elliott 
Associates’ suit). 
84 See id. at 381 (“[W]e hold that [the champerty statute] is not violated when, as 
here, the accused party’s ‘primary goal’ is found to be satisfaction of a valid debt and 
its intent is only to sue absent full performance.”). 
85 886 F. Supp. 1105 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
86 The term “Brady conversion” is used to describe the exchange of loans for 
bonds with a capital injection by the U.S. Treasury Department during the 1980s.  It is 
named after former Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady, who initiated the program.  
For a more extensive explanation of the Brady conversion program, see BUCKLEY, su-
pra note 3, at 102-10. 
87 886 F. Supp. at 1107-08. 
88 Id. at 1107. 
89 See id. at 1119-20 (denying CIBC’s tortious interference claims on the grounds 
that the contract language was unambiguous and permitted Banco Central’s actions). 
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2.  Concern About Moral Hazard 
Fred’s creditors may have another concern.  If the creditors allow 
Fred to restructure his loans unconditionally, he may choose to con-
tinue delaying repayment indefinitely.90  Many think of restructuring 
as an insurance against income loss:  if a person is able to restructure 
her debts, she can reduce the impact of a temporary loss in income.91  
However, it is not always clear that the temporary loss in income will 
be the result of exogenous conditions or creditor negligence.  Just as 
auto accident insurance can cause the insured to be less concerned 
with cautious driving,92 the option of restructuring may cause Fred to 
be less concerned with ensuring that he earns a sufficient income to 
repay his loans.  Consequently, Fred’s creditors may not want to pro-
vide him the option of restructuring because they think that it will 
make him more likely to engage in activities that increase the risk that 
he could not repay his loan in full.  If Fred is able to restructure his 
current debt obligations, his creditors might not want to lend to him 
in the future.93  Although bankruptcy continues to carry severe moral 
repercussions,94 some authors have argued that the existence of cer-
tain restructuring procedures has led to an increase in the number of 
bankruptcy filings and irresponsible financial behavior on the part of 
consumers.95
90 See Adler et al., supra note 43, at 595 (“[T]he more ‘bankruptcy insurance’ the 
borrower has, the less is the difference between the borrower’s solvency and insolvency 
state returns, and the less hard he will work to avoid insolvency.”). 
91 See id. at 587 (noting that bankruptcy exists to provide “partial wage insur-
ance”). 
92 See Eric D. Beal, Posner and Moral Hazard, 7 CONN. INS. L.J. 81, 81-82 (2000) 
(“[I]f the insurer, not the insured, is on the hook for a loss, then the insured may in-
vest less in care, e.g., driving less or more slowly, installing smoke detectors, or eating a 
low fat diet.”). 
93 See Adler et al., supra note 43, at 589-90 (citing evidence that low income con-
sumers have a harder time getting credit in states with higher bankruptcy exemptions); 
id. at 598 n.23 (“[W]hen there can be moral hazard, a firm that has few assets to offer 
to creditors in the insolvency state may be unable to borrow.” (citing Alan Schwartz, 
The Absolute Priority Rule and the Firm’s Investment Policy, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1213 (1994))). 
94 See Todd J. Zywicki, Bankruptcy Law as Social Legislation, 5 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 
393, 397-99 (2001) (“[W]hen a lender extends credit to a borrower, the lender trusts 
the borrower to repay the amount borrowed and such trust relationships inevitably 
carry with them an element of moral obligation. . . . Moral intuitions against bank-
ruptcy [are] universal among societies . . . .”). 
95 See Lynn M. LoPucki, Common Sense Consumer Bankruptcy, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 461, 
462 (1997) (arguing that the bankruptcy system treats alike debtors that are dishonest 
and profligate and debtors that are honest and frugal); White, supra note 48, at 690 
(noting that for debtors living in states with higher property exemptions in bank-
ruptcy, filing for bankruptcy would be a “win-win” situation); Zywicki, supra note 94, at 
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Many sovereign lenders fear that the same moral hazard that 
might cause Fred to be less diligent in finding a job or more extrava-
gant in his spending will cause sovereigns to be less careful with their 
investments or more profligate in their spending.96  Much of the criti-
cism directed at the current proposals for sovereign debt restructuring 
are directed at the moral hazard issue; many creditors fear that mak-
ing debt restructuring easier will also make it more frequent.97  Thus, 
to combat moral hazard and the resulting frequency of defaults, many 
creditors feel that it is necessary to make restructuring difficult.  
Creditors argue that if debtors know ex ante that they will not be able 
to renegotiate their debt easily, they are less likely to take actions that 
would imperil their ability to repay their loans.98  Of course, this risk 
already exists to a certain extent with the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) “lending into arrears,” which occurs when the IMF lends 
to debtor countries after they have defaulted with the intent of help-
ing a creditor deal with a short term crisis.99  Even restrictions on this 
407 (finding that the increased availability of credit to consumers made it easier for 
them to “live beyond their means” because of the prospects of “easy bankruptcy”). 
96 See Seveg, supra note 46, at 44 (arguing that writing off a country’s debt might 
give governments an incentive to over-borrow).  But see Beth A. Simmons, Money and the 
Law:  Why Comply with the Public International Law of Money?, 25 YALE J. INT’L L. 323, 325 
(2000) (arguing that sovereigns comply with their legal obligations so that they may 
“enjoy future economic benefits on favorable terms”). 
97 See Lipworth & Nystedt, supra note 55, at 190 (noting that the official sector is 
concerned with moral hazard); Arturo C. Porzecanski, A Critique of Sovereign Bankruptcy 
Initiatives, BUS. ECON., Jan. 2003, at 39, 42 (arguing that most savvy investors fear that 
making sovereign restructuring easier will lead to a greater need for restructuring); 
Giovanni Dell’Ariccia et al., Moral Hazard and International Crisis Lending:  A Test 5 (Int’l 
Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/02/181, 2002), available at http://www.imf. 
org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2002/wp02181.pdf (finding statistical evidence of moral 
hazard in international lending); Anne O. Krueger, First Deputy Managing Director, 
Int’l Monetary Fund, Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism—One Year Later, Ad-
dress to the European Commission (Dec. 10, 2002), http://www.imf.org/external/ 
np/speeches/2002/121002.htm (noting that creditors fear that if the SDRM reduces 
the cost of restructurings, they will become more frequent).  This problem can also be 
seen in corporations.  Since stockholders face only limited liability for acts of a corpo-
ration, they may be tempted to divert funds to themselves and away from the hands of 
eager creditors.  See, e.g., Dale B. Tauke, Should Bonds Have More Fun?  A Reexamination 
of the Debate over Corporate Bondholder Rights, 1989 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 3 (“Because 
stockholders ordinarily are not individually liable for debts of the corporation, they 
may have incentive in certain circumstances to conduct the affairs of the corporation 
in ways that adversely affect the interests of the debtholders.”). 
98 See Bolton & Skeel, supra note 50, at 770-71 (“Because sovereign debtors know 
they cannot easily renegotiate their debt ex post, they will have a powerful incentive to 
repay the obligations.”). 
99 See Stephen Anthony, IMF Structural Adjustment Programs:  An Econometric Evalua-
tion, 3 GEO. PUB. POL’Y REV. 133, 134 (1998) (describing the rationale for IMF assis-
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moral hazard are flouted:  the IMF’s self-imposed limits on such lend-
ing have been regularly exceeded in recent years.100  Furthermore, the 
conditions on debtor country policies which are often a part of the 
IMF loan are often ignored,101 and as a result, many countries con-
tinue the ruinous policies that led to their initial need for restructur-
ing.102  Given that economic crises are often brought about by factors 
outside of the control of sovereigns, the argument that restructuring 
leads to significant moral hazard is not always applicable.103  However, 
given the numerous causes of default, moral hazard will likely arise as 
a consideration in any restructuring. 
3.  Lack of Coordination 
As a simple logistical matter, Fred’s creditors may have a hard 
time arranging a time to meet.  Bank officials may have to travel from 
distant cities.  The credit card company may be loath to send a deci-
sion maker to such a small restructuring.  Fred’s classmates are all 
busy and may not get along or even know each other.  Furthermore, 
tance to debtor countries).  Thus far, the discussion of moral hazard has been limited 
to debtor moral hazard.  However, IMF lending into arrears and other bailouts can also 
cause creditor moral hazard, which is the risk of unsustainable lending by creditors who 
are under the belief that their credit risks will be underwritten by those providing the 
bailout.  See Seveg, supra note 46, at 44-45 (“The IMF and U.S. government practice of 
guaranteeing part of a sovereign debtor’s interest and principal payments underwrites 
what would otherwise be unsustainable policies.”).  Creditor moral hazard can also 
pose grave problems for sovereign lending practices.  See Barry Eichengreen, Bailing In 
the Private Sector:  Burden Sharing in International Financial Crisis Management, 23 
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 57, 57 (1999) (“The moral hazard thereby created . . . set[] 
the stage for still larger crises and bailouts.”). 
100 See Porzecanski, supra note 97, at 44 tbl.1 (noting that Thailand and Indonesia 
were granted access to about 500% of their quotas in 1997, South Korea was granted 
access to about 1940% of its quota in 1997, and Russia obtained a program worth 
about 450% of its quota in 1998). 
101 See David Fuhr & Zachary Klughaupt, Note, The IMF and AGOA:  A Comparative 
Analysis of Conditionality, 14 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 125, 128 (2004) (noting that 
many bemoan the IMF’s “unwillingness to insist that the conditions be strictly fol-
lowed”); cf. Seveg, supra note 46, at 45 (“The IMF and U.S. government practice of 
guaranteeing part of a sovereign debtor’s interest and principal payments underwrites 
what would otherwise be unsustainable policies . . . .”). 
102 And indeed, few expect this trend to stop.  See Tarullo, supra note 5, at 665 
(“[S]ome moral hazard will continue to affect the market, even if the relative serious-
ness of the moral hazard is reduced.  This is just another way of saying that the IMF will 
continue to provide access to its resources for emerging markets undergoing financial 
distress.”). 
103 See supra text accompanying notes 25-28 (arguing that debt crises stem from a 
number of conditions). 
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Fred’s creditors may not even know that the others exist; they may 
simply know that they are not getting paid the money they are owed. 
This same problem exists for sovereign creditors, but on a much 
larger scale.  As discussed before, a sovereign is likely to have many 
more creditors than a typical consumer debtor.104  A simple vote 
among creditors on how to restructure the debt–-already tricky in the 
case of Fred–-is likely to be even more difficult in the case of a sover-
eign.105  Just as with Fred’s creditors, the diversity of interests that ex-
ists among a sovereign’s creditors may make it difficult even to get eve-
ryone to sit at the same table. 
In addition, there is no leadership among the creditors; just as 
Fred’s credit card company might resent the Bank taking the lead in 
negotiating the restructuring, sovereign creditors have no predeter-
mined leader, and thus may be at a loss when a default occurs.106  
Complicating matters further, there may not even be a list of known 
creditors when a sovereign defaults:  sovereign bonds are traded and 
sold on a regular basis, usually without the prior knowledge of the 
debtor.107  It is worth noting that this situation has not always been 
true.  During the 1980s, when most debt was held in the form of syn-
dicated bank loans, “Bank Advisory Committees” were able to serve in 
a coordinating role.108  However, with the recent multitude of debt is-
sued in the form of bonds with more dispersed creditors, the chal-
lenge of coordinating creditors will be an important consideration in 
formulating a restructuring plan. 
104 See supra note 61 and accompanying text; see also Seveg, supra note 46, at 46 
(noting that a “proliferation of Brady bond issuances” has exacerbated the collective 
action problem in restructurings). 
105 Cf. Bratton & Gulati, supra note 17, at 25 (discussing the frictions inherent in a 
restructuring process). 
106 See Rory Macmillan, Towards a Sovereign Debt Work-out System, 16 NW. J. INT’L L. & 
BUS. 57, 65 (1995) (noting that creditors face problems of “coordinated representation 
and leadership” in negotiating with a sovereign). 
107 See id. at 85 (“Bondholder Councils would be more complex today because of 
the speed at which bonds are now traded.  The changing identities, location and sec-
toral variety of bondholders complicates representation.”). 
108 See Ronald J. Silverman & Mark W. Deveno, Distressed Sovereign Debt:  A Creditor’s 
Perspective, 11 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 179, 181 (2003) (asserting that the confluence 
of interests of banks making syndicated loans allowed for the creation of “steering 
committees,” and therefore that “coordination of . . . a rescheduling effort proved to 
be a manageable task”). 
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II.  WHAT ARE THE EXISTING PROPOSALS FOR  
RESTRUCTURING SOVEREIGN DEBT? 
Both Fred and a sovereign debtor need a way to restructure their 
debt that addresses the concerns identified in Part I.  To recap, nei-
ther Fred nor a sovereign debtor likely has any assets for creditors to 
reach.  Furthermore, neither Fred nor a sovereign debtor can be “liq-
uidated.”  Accordingly, their debt must be restructured in order for 
creditors to maximize their collection returns.  However, such a re-
structuring will be hampered by three principal problems:  creditor 
holdouts, reluctance to restructure because of moral hazard, and lack 
of creditor coordination. 
Luckily for Fred, a practicable debt restructuring mechanism al-
ready exists:  Chapter 13 personal bankruptcy.109  Chapter 13 bank-
ruptcy allows debtors with a regular income, like Fred, to pledge their 
disposable income over a period of three to five years to repaying 
their debts.110  Creditor holdouts are solved by a stay on litigation; no 
creditor is allowed to make a grab for Fred’s $3500.111  The coordina-
tion problem is solved by the involvement of a bankruptcy judge,112 as 
well as a trustee to handle the administration of Fred’s repayment 
plan.113  Some authors argue that moral hazard exists for consumers; 
their argument centers around the ease of filing for bankruptcy and 
its relationship to credit offered to the poor.114  However, the problem 
of creditors not offering a restructuring to a debtor is solved by the 
fact that filing for bankruptcy is voluntary in the United States, and 
creditors are bound by a bankruptcy judge’s order.115
109 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1307, 1321-1330 (2000).  For an overview of Chapter 13 re-
structuring, see White, supra note 48, at 691; Adler et al., supra note 43, at 587-88. 
110 11 U.S.C. § 1322. 
111 See id. § 1301(a) (providing, with a few exceptions, that a creditor may not file a 
civil action to collect consumer debt from the debtor in bankruptcy). 
112 Id. §§ 105, 1324. 
113 Id. § 1302. 
114 See, e.g., Adler et al., supra note 43, at 589 (arguing that more liberal bank-
ruptcy protections to debtors lead to a decrease in the provision of credit to the poor); 
Reint Gropp et al., Personal Bankruptcy and Credit Supply and Demand, 112 Q.J. ECON. 
217, 219-20 (1997) (finding that increasing the level of exemptions in bankruptcy 
might decrease credit offered to all consumers and may completely prevent credit 
from being offered to the poor).  See generally White, supra note 48, at 686 (analyzing 
why bankruptcy filings have become more frequent in the United States). 
115 See 11 U.S.C. § 105 (setting forth the power of a bankruptcy court to “issue any 
order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate” to process a bankruptcy 
filing). 
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A sovereign, however, is not so lucky.  Currently, all restructuring 
is done in an ad hoc manner; nothing resembling the Chapter 13 pro-
tections available to Fred and his creditors is available to a sover-
eign.116  Some parties find nothing wrong with this.  One commenta-
tor has argued that creditors are eager for debtors to “bind 
[themselves] to the mast” of their debt so that they are not tempted to 
restructure capriciously.117  Others find some positive attributes in 
holdout litigation.  In particular, Fisch and Gentile argue that holdout 
litigation protects minority creditors,118 helps to aggregate debt in vul-
ture funds,119 provides a check on opportunistic default,120 and pro-
vides liquidity in the market by attracting investors interested in dis-
tressed debt.121  Still other commentators find that existing proposals, 
as this Comment will conclude, are simply inadequate.122  Neverthe-
less, the official sector (government and international organiza-
tions),123 the private sector,124 and the legal academy125 seem to be coa-
116 For a discussion of options that currently exist for a sovereign facing an inves-
tor panic crisis, see BARRY EICHENGREEN, CAN THE MORAL HAZARD CAUSED BY IMF 
BAILOUTS BE REDUCED? 6-12 (Geneva Rep. on World Econ., Spec. Rep. 1, 2000). 
117 Bolton & Skeel, supra note 50, at 771. 
118 See Fisch & Gentile, supra note 5, at 1098 (“[H]oldout litigation offers a 
mechanism by which minority creditors can challenge restructurings designed princi-
pally for the benefit of the majority of the creditors.”). 
119 See id. (“By aggregating claims, vulture funds may serve as a forum for coordi-
nating the actions of creditors . . . .”). 
120 See id. at 1099 (“If sovereign debtors expect that creditors, especially recalci-
trant creditors, will enforce their claims through litigation, then they may be less likely 
to default when they are able to make the payments required on their debts.”). 
121 See id. at 1100 (“[Vulture] funds create liquidity for other investors by offering 
them a means of exiting the market for a fixed sum of money.”). 
122 See, e.g., Porzecanski, supra note 97, at 39, 44 (criticizing both the SDRM and 
what the author considers the less harmful option, collective action clauses). 
123 See, e.g., Haque & Burdescu, supra note 13, at 243-44 (discussing the goals of the 
official sector as represented at the Monterrey conference, including an improvement 
in the way that sovereign debt is restructured); Lipworth & Nystedt, supra note 55, at 
190 (discussing official sector goals for improving sovereign debt restructuring); Ta-
rullo, supra note 5, at 660-64 (examining five goals of the official sector with regards to 
sovereign debt restructuring). 
124 See, e.g., Whitney Debevoise, The Debt Crisis Debate, LATINFINANCE, Nov. 2002, at 
52, 53 (discussing the private sector’s move to bolster the proposal for collective action 
clauses over the one for the SDRM). 
125 See, e.g., Bolton & Skeel, supra note 50 (advocating a sovereign debt restructur-
ing framework); Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Exit Consents in Sovereign Bond Ex-
changes, 48 UCLA L. REV. 59 (2000) (arguing for the use of exit consents to address 
sovereign defaults); Gelpern, supra note 6 (proposing a new “seating chart” for sover-
eign debt restructurings); Macmillan, supra note 106 (recommending policy guidelines 
for constructing a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism). 
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lescing around the idea that changes need to be made in the way that 
a defaulting sovereign restructures its debt. 
So far, commentators have proposed a number of changes.  One 
commentator has proposed a sovereign bankruptcy convention based 
loosely on Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the United States.126  This pro-
posal has not attracted much support because of the inherent prob-
lems in applying a corporate debt restructuring framework to a sover-
eign,127 as well as the substantial challenges, including the very slow 
response time, in getting an international convention negotiated and 
approved.128
Other commentators propose applying Chapter 9 municipal 
bankruptcy to the sovereign context.129  At first glance, this proposal 
has some merit; like sovereigns, municipalities are polities and thus 
cannot be liquidated.130  Yet, this proposal is fraught with problems.  
First, existing proposals that use a Chapter 9 framework may tilt too 
far towards protecting the debtor.131  As discussed before, restructur-
ing regimes that provide too much protection for debtors may lead to 
moral hazard, and, ultimately, to an increase in lending costs.132  Fur-
thermore, the application of Chapter 9 to municipalities in the United 
126 See Schwarcz, supra note 56, at 966-67 (arguing that a multilateral bankruptcy 
convention, monitored by the IMF, would be superior to contractual solutions). 
127 See Rasmussen, supra note 5, at 1162 (“[C]orporate reorganization law cannot 
capture all of the relevant dynamics surrounding sovereign debt restructuring.”). 
128 See Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdictional Equilibration, the Proposed Hague Convention 
and Progress in National Law, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 203, 203 (2001) (noting that negotiat-
ing international agreements is “no sport for the short-winded” (internal citation and 
quotation marks omitted)); Susan B. Hunt, ASIL Sponsors Panel at UNA National Assem-
bly in Washington, AM. SOC’Y. INT’L L. NEWSL., Sept.-Oct. 1995, at 16, 16 (finding that 
the International Law Commission, responsible for drafting many conventions, works 
at a “glacial” speed); cf. Elizabeth Warner, Behind the Wedding Veil:  Child Marriage as a 
Form of Trafficking in Girls, 12 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 233, 268 (2004) (noting 
the difficulties in amending international conventions). 
129 See, e.g., ANN PETTIFOR, NEW ECON. FOUND., CHAPTER 9/11?  RESOLVING IN-
TERNATIONAL DEBT CRISES—THE JUBILEE FRAMEWORK FOR INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY 
3 (2002), http://www.jubilee2000uk.org/analysis/reports/jubilee_framework.html (proposing a 
debt restructuring framework based on Chapter 9); see also Seveg, supra note 46, at 68-
75 (providing an extensive discussion of the Jubilee Framework proposal). 
130 See 11 U.S.C. § 904 (2000) (“[T]he court may not, by any stay, order, or decree, 
in the case or otherwise, interfere with . . . any of the property or revenues of the 
debtor [municipality] . . . .”). 
131 See Seveg, supra note 46, at 75 (claiming that a proposal for sovereign debt re-
structuring based on Chapter 9 would lead to moral hazard because it facilitates re-
structurings by sovereigns without sufficient safeguards against abuse). 
132 See supra notes 96-103 and accompanying text (discussing problems of moral 
hazard in restructuring). 
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States has rarely been tested because courts have required that mu-
nicipalities be completely insolvent—that is, without any money to pay 
their debts–-before allowing a petition to be filed.133  Yet it is rarely the 
case that a sovereign meets this requirement.134
Finally, notwithstanding the limitations on interference with a 
municipality’s political prerogatives, a municipality remains subject to 
the sovereignty of the federal government, as well as the control of 
state governments.135  As a result, some commentators argue that a 
bankruptcy judge might have the power to refuse approval of a reor-
ganization plan unless a municipality raises taxes.136  Given that supra-
national organizations have had difficulty effecting similar policy 
changes in debtor countries137 (and that creditors have been unable to 
enforce their security interests in loans without military interven-
tion),138 it is unlikely that courts will be able to intervene successfully 
in the domestic affairs of a foreign state. 
Of the remaining proposals, the two that have attracted the most 
attention are the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism, proposed 
133 See Daniel K. Tarullo, Rules, Discretion, and Authority in International Financial Re-
form, 4 J. INT’L ECON. L. 613, 637-38 (2001) (“[T]he municipality must be either not 
repaying its debts or unable to pay debts as they become due.”). 
134 See supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text (discussing the factors that deter 
sovereigns from outright and opportunistic repudiation of debt). 
135 See Christopher Smith, Comment, Provisions for Access to Chapter 9 Bankruptcy:  
Their Flaws and the Inadequacy of Past Reforms, 14 BANKR. DEV. J. 497, 499 
(1998) (showing that the power to legislate and adjudicate municipal bankruptcies is 
divided between the federal and state governments). 
136 See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke:  A 
Conceptual Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 465-66 (1993) 
(suggesting that Kelley v. Everglades Drainage District, 319 U.S. 415 (1943), and Fano v. 
Newport Heights Irrigation District, 114 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1940), might give a bankruptcy 
judge the power to deny a reorganization plan that did not raise taxes if in the best in-
terests of creditors). 
137 See Carlos Santiso, Good Governance and Aid Effectiveness:  The World Bank and 
Conditionality, 7 GEO. PUB. POL’Y REV. 1, 8 (2001) (“The failure of [the World Bank’s 
policy of] conditionality to attain its desired objectives and bring about sustained pol-
icy reforms is widely recognized.”). 
138 See Buchheit & Pam, supra note 54, at 898 (“[B]ondholders typically lacked the 
ability to enforce the security interest in the borrower’s own territory absent some dip-
lomatic or military assistance from their own governments.”).  As a result, secured 
lending to sovereigns has declined in the past century.  Id. 
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by the IMF’s Anne Krueger,139 and the use of collective action clauses 
in bonds, supported by the U.S. Treasury Department.140
A.  Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism 
In 2001, Anne Krueger, first deputy managing director of the IMF, 
proposed a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) in re-
sponse to a series of recent debt crises.141  She identified four key fea-
tures of the restructuring mechanism.  First, the SDRM would include 
the possibility of a stay of litigation in national courts.142  Second, the 
SDRM would require the debtor to negotiate with its creditors in good 
faith.143  Third, the SDRM would provide for a form of debtor-in-
possession financing by guaranteeing that new lenders to the sover-
eign would have priority in post-restructuring repayment schedules.144  
Last, the SDRM would be binding on all creditors.145  Krueger argued 
that these features would make “an early agreement [to restructure 
debts] more likely and eliminate the threat of disruptive litigation 
later.”146  Krueger further argued that placing responsibility for ad-
ministration of the SDRM in the IMF would prevent forum shopping, 
139 Anne Krueger, First Deputy Managing Dir., Int’l Monetary Fund, Address to 
the National Economists’ Club Annual Members’ Dinner, International Financial Ar-
chitecture for 2002:  A New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring (Nov. 26, 
2001), http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2001/112601.htm. 
140 See, e.g., Richard H. Clarida, Assistant Sec’y for Econ. Policy, U.S. Treasury 
Dep’t, Remarks at the National Association for Business Economics Annual Meeting 
(Sept. 30, 2002), http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/po3481b.htm (reporting that 
agreement was achieved to move forward with the use of collective action clauses); 
John B. Taylor, Under Sec’y for Int’l Affairs, U.S. Treasury Dep’t, Sovereign Debt Re-
structuring:  A U.S. Perspective, Remarks at the Institute for International Economics 
Conference Sovereign Debt Workouts:  Hopes and Hazards (Apr. 2, 2002), 
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/po2056.htm (explaining more extensively the 
U.S. proposal to encourage the use of collective action clauses). 
141 See Krueger, supra note 139 (setting forth Krueger’s proposal for the SDRM); 
see also Silverman & Deveno, supra note 108, at 192 (highlighting ten key points of the 
SDRM proposal). 
142 Krueger, supra note 139. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
146 Anne Krueger, First Deputy Managing Dir., Int’l Monetary Fund, New Ap-
proaches to Sovereign Debt Restructuring:  An Update on Our Thinking, Remarks at 
the Institute for International Economics Conference Sovereign Debt Workouts:  
Hopes and Hazards (Apr. 1, 2002), http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/ 
2002/040102.htm. 
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ensure a uniform interpretation of the procedure, and avoid free-
rider problems.147
The IMF’s proposal—spelled out in The Design of the Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring Mechanism—Further Considerations—clarified several 
things:  the rationale for the SDRM, which claims would be covered 
under the SDRM, what the consequences of activation would be for 
the debtor, and how creditor participation would be coordinated.148  
Several months later, the IMF elaborated on its proposal in Proposed 
Features of a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism.149  The IMF wrote 
that debtors would be able to initiate a restructuring without any ex 
ante review,150 and that the stay of litigation would not be automatic 
(and perhaps would not occur at all).151
The IMF’s proposal attracted substantial commentary from legal 
scholars.  Skeel and Bolton noted that, while an automatic stay would 
not be included in the SDRM, the “[Hotchpot] rule requires that any 
payment or asset collected by a plaintiff through litigation must be 
offset against the plaintiff’s claim in the restructuring agreement.”152  
Furthermore, an SDRM judge might, with the approval of creditors, 
approve a limited stay on litigation.153  Bratton and Gulati added that a 
stay of payments would be approved only if the creditor was acting in 
good faith in pursuing a restructuring.154  Commentators have also 
addressed the SDRM’s selection of bankruptcy judges,155 debtor-in-
147 Id. 
148 LEGAL & POLICY DEV. & REVIEW DEP’TS, INT’L MONETARY FUND, THE DESIGN OF 
THE SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING MECHANISM—FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS 
(2002), http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/sdrm/2002/112702.pdf [hereinafter 
IMF, FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS]. 
149 LEGAL & POLICY DEV. & REVIEW DEP’TS, INT’L MONETARY FUND, PROPOSED 
FEATURES OF A SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING MECHANISM (2003), 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/sdrm/2003/021203.pdf [hereinafter IMF, 
PROPOSED FEATURES]. 
150 See id. at 4 (“[T]he debtor should be allowed to activate the mechanism unilat-
erally, without third-party confirmation that the activation is justified.”). 
151 See id. at 9-10 (weighing the pros and cons of an automatic stay of litigation and 
finding that it may tilt the SDRM too far in favor of the debtor). 
152 Bolton & Skeel, supra note 50, at 777. 
153 See id. (“The IMF’s proposed plan . . . propos[es] that the judge could have the 
authority to stay specific legal actions on request of the debtor . . . .”). 
154 See Bratton & Gulati, supra note 17, at 28 (noting that the IMF would only grant 
a “standstill” if “the debtor is acting in ‘good faith’ and is committed to adjusting its 
debts”). 
155 See, e.g., Bolton & Skeel, supra note 50, at 811-12 (faulting the SDRM judicial 
selection process as too biased in favor of the IMF and suggesting use of existing bank-
ruptcy courts as an alternative); Hal S. Scott, A Bankruptcy Procedure for Sovereign Debt-
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possession (DIP) financing,156 and systems of priorities for repay-
ment.157
At first glance, the SDRM has some attractive features.  The plan 
recognizes that sovereign debt needs a restructuring plan, not a liqui-
dation plan.  It addresses the creditor holdout problem by providing 
for at least the possibility of a stay of litigation.158  The creditor coor-
dination problem is solved by providing for bankruptcy judges and an 
institutional debt restructuring forum. 
However, the SDRM falls short because it does not adequately ad-
dress the problem of debtor moral hazard.  Just as lenders fear that 
making bankruptcy easy for Fred will lead him to make opportunistic 
decisions, creditors feel that the SDRM makes it too easy for sover-
eigns to default (and that as a result they will do so opportunistically).  
For example, the managing director of ABN AMRO, a bank heavily 
involved in sovereign lending, argued that the proposed SDRM “has 
started to alienate the already limited investor base for sovereign 
bonds that are rated below investment grade.”159  Anne Krueger ex-
plicitly acknowledged this in a speech reviewing her proposal, noting 
that creditors wonder:  “[T]o the extent that the SDRM reduces the 
cost of restructurings, will it not increase their frequency?”160
Debtor nations also opposed the SDRM because they were fearful 
that it would eventually raise their cost of credit by introducing re-
structuring procedures that rely on the relatively weak powers of in-
ors?, 37 INT’L LAW. 103, 134 (2003) (suggesting that the selection of judges be based on 
the selection process for arbitrators in NAFTA disputes). 
156 See, e.g., Alinna Arora & Rodrigo Olivares Caminal, Rethinking the Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring Approach, 9 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 629, 641-46 (2003) (arguing that DIP fi-
nancing could replace current IMF lending into arrears); Bratton & Gulati, supra note 
17, at 33 (“If the [DIP] loan proceeds are badly managed and the new capital does not 
assist the recovery process, but instead, say, flows out of the country, then a priority 
credit facility worsens the position of preexisting creditors.”); Bolton & Skeel, supra 
note 50, at 779 (“[The IMF Plan] only gives lip service to the issue of DIP financing.”); 
Sedlak, supra note 5, at 1510 (arguing that the SDRM is superior to collective action 
clauses because of the DIP financing provisions). 
157 See, e.g., Gelpern, supra note 6, at 1138-55 (proposing a contractual alternative 
to the priority system set out in the SDRM); Scott, supra note 155, at 124-25 (distin-
guishing the priority systems in the SDRM and Chapter Eleven Bankruptcy). 
158 The hesitancy of the IMF to promote something like a full automatic stay, how-
ever, could be a potential pitfall of the plan as well.  Cf. Bolton & Skeel, supra note 50, 
at 777 (noting that only a limited stay is foreseen in the SDRM). 
159 Porzecanski, supra note 97, at 39, 44.  Note that Porzecanski acknowledges that 
the alienation stems from “the Treasury [Department’s] and IMF’s persistent advocacy 
on the issue,” and not necessarily from the SDRM itself.  Id. at 44. 
160 Krueger, supra note 97. 
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ternational bodies.161  Other debtor-countries expressed concerns 
about the infringement on sovereignty.162  The IMF plan might distort 
credit markets and thus be costly to national economies.163  Given that 
the IMF will control the restructuring process, creditors are unlikely to 
agree upon a resolution any more quickly than they are in the absence 
of the SDRM.164  Additionally, the SDRM does not allow for restructur-
ing procedures to be tailored specifically to a country’s needs.  These 
concerns echo those directed at mandatory corporate bankruptcy in 
the United States, namely, the idea that a broad, legislatively imple-
mented bankruptcy system cannot take into account individual credi-
tor and debtor interests.165  Debtors might simply try to contract 
around default bankruptcy rules that they find unpalatable.166  Lastly, 
approval of the SDRM would require an amendment to the IMF Arti-
cles of Agreement.167  Given that such an amendment would require 
161 See Antonio Palocci Filho, Minister of Finance, Brazil, Statement to the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund and Financial Committee Meeting (Apr. 12, 2003),  
http://www.imf.org/external/spring/2003/imfc/state/eng/bra.htm (representing 
the countries of Brazil, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guyana, Haiti, 
Panama, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago and arguing that the “creation of the 
SDRM could reduce the volume of capital flows to developing countries and increase 
their borrowing costs”); see also Celeste Boeri, Development, How To Solve Argentina’s 
Debt Crisis:  Will The IMF’s Plan Work?, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 245, 252-53 (2003) (arguing 
that the SDRM would increase risk for investors, implying a rise in borrowing costs). 
162 See Boeri, supra note 161, at 250 (arguing that Argentina would resent the 
SDRM as an illegitimate intrusion on its sovereignty); Nicolás Eyzaguirre, Minister of 
Finance, Chile, Statement to the International Monetary Fund and Financial Commit-
tee Meeting (Sept. 28, 2002), http://www.imf.org/external/am/2002/imfc/ 
state/eng/chl.htm (representing the countries of Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, and 
Uruguay and advocating that “the framework . . . envisage sufficient flexibility for the 
sovereign debtor to determine the categories of debt to be excluded from the mecha-
nism”). 
163 See Bratton & Gulati, supra note 17, at 10 (“A bankruptcy procedure suited to 
the IMF’s institutional preferences could also be distortionary and costly if it made 
lenders to a distressed sovereign worse off than they would have been in its ab-
sence . . . .”). 
164 See id. at 31-32 (arguing that if the IMF continues to lend into arrears, creditors 
may decline to participate in the SDRM process). 
165 See Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 60 (“It is hard to imagine that either the courts 
or Congress can better protect the values at issue than those immediately affected.”). 
166 See id. at 62 (“If, however, the gain from the switch [from a default rule] to the 
more efficient [contractual] rule exceeds the bargaining cost, the parties will bargain 
to the more efficient result.”). 
167 Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, adopted July 22, 
1944, 60 Stat. 1401, 2 U.N.T.S. 39, amended by Amendment of Articles of Agreement of 
the International Monetary Fund, approved May 31, 1968, 20 U.S.T. 2775, amended by 
Second Amendment of Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, ap-
proved Apr. 30, 1976, 29 U.S.T. 2203, amended by Third Amendment of Articles of 
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the approval of 85% of the total voting power,168 and that the United 
States, which has declared its opposition to the SDRM,169 controls 17% 
of the vote,170 the initiative is simply unlikely to pass. 
B.  Collective Action Clauses 
The solution that has thus far caught the attention of markets has 
been the “collective action clause” (CAC).171  To understand why the 
CAC represents a change in the way sovereign lending occurs, one 
must look back almost seventy years, to 1939.  The year after Congress 
provided for corporate debt reorganization,172 it passed the Trust In-
denture Act, which required that bonds be issued via a trust indenture 
and specified that “the right of any holder of any indenture security to 
receive payment of the principal of and interest on such indenture se-
curity . . . shall not be impaired or affected without the consent of 
such holder.”173  As a result, no bond term concerning repayment 
could be amended without the unanimous consent of all bondhold-
ers, thus giving rise to the term “unanimous action clause” (UAC).  Of 
Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, approved June 28, 1990, T.I.A.S. No. 
11,898 [hereinafter IMF Articles]; see François Gianviti, The IMF and the Liberalization of 
Capital Markets, 19 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 773, 782-83 (1997) (arguing that, even if the IMF 
Articles were to be reinterpreted, the SDRM would still require subsequent amend-
ments). 
168 IMF Articles, supra note 167, art. XXVIII(a). 
169 See John W. Snow, U.S. Treasury Sec’y, Statement to the International Monetary 
Fund and Financial Committee (Apr. 12, 2003), http://www.imf.org/external/spring/ 
2003/imfc/state/eng/usa.htm (“[I]t is neither necessary nor feasible to continue 
working on SDRM.”); see also HAL S. SCOTT, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE:  TRANSACTIONS, 
POLICY, & REGULATION 671 (11th ed. 2004) (describing the United States’s position). 
170 See Int’l Monetary Fund, IMF Members’ Quotas and Voting Power, and IMF 
Board of Governors, http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.htm 
(last updated Nov. 21, 2005) (detailing member states’ voting power and listing the 
United States as controlling 17.08% of the total votes) . 
171 For a more extended discussion of collective action clauses, see SCOTT, supra 
note 169, at 664-70. 
172 Chandler Act, Pub. L. No. 75-696, 52 Stat. 840 (1938) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.). 
173 Pub. L. No. 76-253, 53 Stat. 1149 (1939) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.  
§ 77aaa-bbbb (2000)).  Specifically, § 77eee(b)(1)(A) requires the Securities and Ex-
change Commission to refuse to register any bond issue that has not been issued un-
der a qualified indenture, and § 77ppp(b), as quoted above, prohibits the impairment 
of payment obligations to a creditor without the consent of that creditor.  See generally 
PHILIP R. WOOD, INTERNATIONAL LOANS, BONDS AND SECURITIES REGULATION 167 
(1995) (discussing trustee requirements in the United States); Robert B. Ahdieh, Be-
tween Mandate and Market:  Contract Transition in the Shadow of the International Order, 53 
EMORY L.J. 691, 701-02 (2004) (examining the history behind and subsequent to the 
prohibition on majority action clauses). 
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course, the Act explicitly exempted securities issued by foreign gov-
ernments, which were free to amend payment terms by majority con-
sent—the so-called “majority action clause” (MAC)—as English bonds 
did.174  Nevertheless, for a variety of reasons, including drafting inertia 
and network externalities, sovereign bonds issued in New York tended 
to include UACs instead of MACs.175
The problem that UACs pose for restructurings is that they permit 
a minority of bondholders to resist restructuring.  Instead, the minor-
ity bondholders may hold out for full payment and sue to collect their 
debt if they are not paid.  These lawsuits can then trigger cross-default 
clauses in the debtor’s other debt instruments, which can lead to an 
even greater financial crisis.176  Furthermore, bonds rarely contain 
“sharing clauses” requiring that bondholders who collect through liti-
gation share the proceeds with the other bondholders in the issu-
ance.177  On occasion, a debtor country could escape these restraints 
with an exit amendment to certain nonpayment terms (such as the 
waiver of sovereign immunity or consent to jurisdiction), thus reduc-
ing the value of the existing bonds.178  These “exit consents” can be 
tricky, however, because they appear to many to be coercive and could 
be used to achieve nonrestructuring goals.179  Thus, the U.S. Treasury 
174 See 15 U.S.C. § 77ddd(a)(6) (2000) (exempting bonds issued by a foreign gov-
ernment from regulation under the Trust Indenture Act); Ahdieh, supra note 173, at 
698 (noting that English bonds typically contain majority action clauses); see also Barry 
Eichengreen & Ashoka Mody, Bail-Ins, Bailouts, and Borrowing Costs, 47 IMF STAFF PA-
PERS 155, 158 (2001) (describing English-style majority action clauses). 
175 See Ahdieh, supra note 173, at 702 (finding that a “path dependence of form 
contracts” might have contributed to the reluctance to drop UAC requirements from 
sovereign bond contracts). 
176 See EICHENGREEN, supra note 116, at 14 (“A lawsuit can trigger cross-default 
clauses in the country’s other debt instruments, in turn activating acceleration clauses 
requiring those debts to be repaid immediately.”). 
177 See id. (“Bonds lack sharing clauses requiring individual creditors to share any 
amounts recovered with other bondholders . . . .”); see also Torbjörn Becker et al., Bond 
Restructuring and Moral Hazard:  Are Collective Action Clauses Costly?, 61 J. INT’L ECON. 
127, 130 (2003) (noting that such sharing provisions are one of three key identifying 
features of collective action clauses). 
178 See Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 125, at 78-79 (noting this strategy’s emer-
gence in the late 1980s).  Such exchanges have been held legal as applied to corporate 
bonds with unanimous action clauses.  See, e.g., Katz v. Oak Indus., 508 A.2d 873, 880 
(Del. Ch. 1986) (holding that an exit consent exchange offer did not violate the im-
plied covenant of good faith); see also Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 125, at 70-75 (ana-
lyzing the Katz case).  Indeed, some countries have even been able to take advantage of 
exit consents.  See Porzecanski, supra note 97, at 41-42 (noting that Ecuador, Russia, the 
Ukraine, and Pakistan have used exit consents to restructure bonds). 
179 See Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 125, at 68 (“Exit amendments of this kind in-
volve an obvious element of coercion.”). 
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Department proposed that future bonds be issued with CACs that 
would allow a supermajority of bondholders to amend payment terms 
in order to restructure debt.180  The idea is that “restructuring of prob-
lem debts could then be left to the consenting adults involved,” with-
out the involvement of governments or international organizations.181  
The supermajority of bondholders would ostensibly delay some pay-
ments and perhaps reduce the principal owed.  This would give the 
debtor country the “fresh start” envisioned in consumer bankruptcy182 
by providing fresh resources to generate growth and eventually allow 
the debtor country to repay its debts. 
With the explicit support of the United States government,183 a 
sizeable number of countries have begun to include CACs in their 
New York-issued bond agreements.184  The growing number of coun-
tries now including CACs in bond agreements means that creditors 
have, at least reluctantly, acceded to the reality of collective action 
clauses.  Thus, the contractual solution appears to be winning out 
over the SDRM.  CACs, like the SDRM, provide creditors the option of 
restructuring, but not liquidation.  They address the problem of credi-
tor holdouts by allowing a majority of bondholders to impose new 
terms on a minority holdout.  The CAC improves upon the SDRM by 
at least partially addressing the moral hazard problem:  only bond-
holders can invoke the CAC, so ostensibly sovereigns will not receive 
restructurings if they are acting opportunistically.  Thus far, evidence 
180 John B. Taylor, Under Sec’y for Int’l Affairs, U.S. Treasury Dep’t, Using Clauses 
to Reform the Process for Sovereign Debt Workouts:  Progress and Next Steps, Re-
marks to the Emerging Market Traders Association Annual Meeting (Dec. 5, 2002), 
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/po3672.htm.  One might argue that collective 
action clauses reflect the “creditors’ bargain” theory of sovereign debt, in that “credi-
tors first extend credit to the firm and thus obtain their nonbankruptcy-law collection 
rights” by purchasing bonds, “and then they craft a bankruptcy regime among them-
selves based on these rights,” if necessary, through the use of collective action clauses 
in times of crisis.  Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 59. 
181 Eichengreen & Mody, supra note 174, at 158. 
182 See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text (discussing the Bankruptcy Code’s 
allowance for a personal debtor to retain certain assets so as to have a “fresh start”). 
183 See Press Release, U.S. Treasury Dep’t, Statement of Under Secretary John B. 
Taylor Regarding the Decisions by Countries to Issue Bonds with Collective Action 
Clauses (CACs) (Feb. 3, 2004), http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/js1144.htm (“The 
Treasury [Department] encourages all countries that issue external bonds under New 
York law to include collective action clauses in their offerings.”). 
184 The list of countries that have issued New York bonds with collective action 
clauses includes Mexico, Brazil, Korea, South Africa, Turkey, the Philippines, Panama, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Indonesia, and Israel.  Taylor, supra note 64; see also id. (describ-
ing the “dramatic progress that has been made in implementing [CACs]”). 
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shows that markets are not charging higher risk premiums for bonds 
with CACs.185
CACs, however, pose serious coordination obstacles for truly com-
prehensive restructurings.  First, a CAC allows changes only to the 
bond containing it.  For a small country with one or two bond issu-
ances, this may not be a problem.  But when one looks at a country 
like Argentina, which has 152 separate bond issues186 and a multitude 
of other forms of debt, the coordination problems become quite a bit 
trickier.187  The diversity of investors exacerbates coordination prob-
lems:  a large bank with a syndicated loan may have a different per-
spective on default than does a retail investor.188  Even the Treasury 
Department acknowledges this problem, noting that “most proposals 
do not allow for collective action across different classes of debt.”189  
Furthermore, the fact that there is no “standard” CAC in all debt in-
struments means that there may be varying potential for holdouts.190  
One commentator has noted that CACs pose the risk of undermining 
absolute priority schemes.191  Others find that CACs create the possi-
185 See Becker et al., supra note 177, at 157 (finding that collective action clauses 
have a minimal, if any, impact on sovereign bond yield spreads).  But see Eichengreen 
& Mody, supra note 174, at 157 (“These clauses appear to raise the costs of market ac-
cess for borrowers with low credit ratings . . . .”).  Nevertheless, “the penetration of 
CACs [in the market] is both wide and increasingly deep.”  Sergio J. Galvis & Angel L. 
Saad, Sovereign Exchange Offers in 2010, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 219, 224 (2005). 
186 See supra note 61 and accompanying text (illustrating the complexity of sover-
eigns’ loans and specifically describing Argentina’s bond issues). 
187 See Gelpern, supra note 6, at 1116 (describing a long history of “intercreditor 
battles in sovereign debt crises”); supra Part I.C.3 (discussing coordination problems in 
bonds). 
188 See Fisch & Gentile, supra note 5, at 1071 (discussing the different justifications 
for purchasing and holding bonds among different types of investors). 
189 Taylor, supra note 180. 
190 See Bratton & Gulati, supra note 17, at 47 (“Although the 75 percent threshold 
[of creditors’ votes required for a restructuring] appears to be winning, it is still too 
early to predict where the market will settle, or whether it will settle on CACs at all.”); 
Debevoise, supra note 124, at 53 (noting that the Emerging Markets Creditors Associa-
tion proposed a 95% threshold and that the executive board of the IMF considered 
this too high).  Earlier CACs with lower thresholds risk being undermined by subse-
quent CACs with higher thresholds.  For example, creditors who have enough votes to 
restructure Bond A containing a CAC with a 75% threshold may be hesitant to do so if 
they know that Bond B containing a 95% threshold will not be restructured because of 
holdouts.  The holdout creditors of Bond B will receive a side payment to facilitate re-
structuring, allowing them to receive a higher pro rata share of the debtor’s assets than 
the holdout creditors of Bond A. 
191 See Bolton & Skeel, supra note 50, at 774-75 (arguing that if restructuring is 
done through collective action clauses, there is no guarantee that absolute priority will 
be observed). 
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bility of opportunistic collusion.192  All of this uncertainty poses prob-
lems for valuing risk, and may result in higher borrowing costs than if 
there were greater certainty as to the restructuring process.193
While the problem of moral hazard and lack of U.S. support ap-
pear to have dealt the SDRM a fatal blow,194 the problem of coordina-
tion with CACs can be remedied.  The key will be to create a more ex-
tensive contractual solution that can be custom tailored to a debtor 
country’s coordination needs, but that lacks the moral hazard of the 
SDRM. 
III.   A PROPOSAL: 
A “DESIGNER” SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING MECHANISM 
This Comment proposes that each debtor country create a “De-
signer” Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (DSDRM) tailored 
to each country’s individual needs.  It is worth noting at the outset 
that this idea is not entirely new; various commentators have re-
marked on the ramifications of allowing countries to create bank-
ruptcy contracts.195  This Comment intends to elaborate on these pro-
posals, and to argue that a contractual solution will best meet the 
needs of debtor countries. 
192 See Bratton & Gulati, supra note 17, at 60 (hypothesizing a scenario in which a 
debtor makes a side payment to a majority of creditors to amend bonds under the col-
lective action clauses in a way that would prejudice the minority not voting for the 
amendment). 
193 See Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 57-58 (“So long as a creditor can anticipate its 
treatment in bankruptcy, it can ensure that it receives a market-based rate of return on 
its loan.”). 
194 See Walden Bello, Globalist Project Crisis and the New Economics of Empire, BUSI-
NESSWORLD, June 20, 2003, at 1 (“[T]he US Treasury recently torpedoed the IMF 
management’s proposal for a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) to 
enable developing countries to restructure their debt while giving them a measure of 
protection from creditors.”); supra notes 159-69 and accompanying text (explaining 
the fatal defects of the SDRM proposal). 
195 See, e.g., Bolton & Skeel, supra note 50, at 818-21 (discussing whether a debtor 
country should be allowed to design its own SDRM); Gelpern, supra note 6, at 1150-52 
(proposing that countries explicitly set forth priority structures by contract); see also 
John A. Carlson et al., Debt Reduction and New Loans:  A Contracting Perspective 8-15 (Int’l 
Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/97/95, 1997), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/wp9795.pdf (using econometrics to analyze 
contracts that provide for rescheduling). 
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A.  The Theoretical Framework 
The initial challenge with a contractual bankruptcy framework is 
that, at least within the United States, there are few examples to draw 
on.  Use of the Bankruptcy Code in the United States is mandatory;196 
thus, one sees few ex ante restructuring contracts.  This, however, 
does not mean that contractual bankruptcy frameworks would be im-
possible.  In fact, it seems that bankruptcy is the “odd man out” when 
one considers contracts.  While the law of contracts contains a num-
ber of default rules, there are relatively few mandatory contract rules.  
With bankruptcy law, the opposite is the case.197  No commentator has 
suggested that contracting around mandatory rules in the field of per-
sonal bankruptcy be allowed, probably owing to the inequality of bar-
gaining power;198 however, there have been suggestions to allow con-
tracting around corporate bankruptcy laws.199  In this way, a sovereign 
is more like a corporation than an individual; both a sovereign and a 
corporation tend to be sophisticated contracting parties.  Sovereigns, 
196 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2000) (providing for an automatic stay of litigation upon 
commencement of a bankruptcy litigation and thus foreclosing enforcement of con-
tractual alternatives); see also In re Weitzen, 3 F. Supp. 698, 698 (S.D.N.Y. 1933) (“The 
agreement to waive the benefit of bankruptcy is unenforceable.”). 
 However, some commentators argue that certain provisions of the Bankruptcy 
Code have been waived contractually.  See Susan Block-Lieb, The Politics of Privatizing 
Business Bankruptcy Law, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 77, 80 n.17 (2000) (citing several articles 
that recognize that there is increasing use of waivers in bankruptcy cases).  But see 
NAT’L BANKR. REVIEW COMM’N, BANKRUPTCY:  THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 459-87 (1997) 
(listing the considerations weighing for and against enforcement of bankruptcy con-
tracts and concluding that neither bankruptcy law nor policy would permit the waiver 
of rights contained in Chapter 11 bankruptcy).  Nevertheless, courts are divided on the 
enforcement of these waivers, and few scholars expect Congress to explicitly authorize 
greater private contracting for bankruptcy.  See Block-Lieb, supra, at 84 (“No commen-
tator has predicted the enactment of legislation authorizing the contract bankruptcy 
proposals . . . .”). 
197 See, e.g., Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 53 (arguing that mandatory bankruptcy 
rules are “anomalous” when considered within the greater context of contract law). 
198 See Rasmussen, supra note 5, at 1164 (“The case for allowing freedom of choice 
for individuals is more problematic, with most agreeing that individuals should not be 
able to waive their right to file for bankruptcy.”); see also Williams v. Walker-Thomas 
Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 & n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (suggesting that inequality of 
bargaining power might make a contract unenforceable on the grounds that it would 
be unconscionable). 
199 See, e.g., Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 66 (proposing that corporations be able to 
elect from a “menu of bankruptcy options”); Schwartz, supra note 47, at 1809 (advocat-
ing a contract theory of bankruptcy with respect to firms).  Rasmussen argues that sov-
ereigns present an “intermediate case,” and should perhaps be allowed unlimited 
freedom of choice.  Rasmussen, supra note 5, at 1164. 
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like corporations, are generally represented by large law firms, most of 
whom have had experience with sovereign lending contracts.200
Much of the theoretical groundwork for contractual bankruptcy 
frameworks has been set forth in two articles by Alan Schwartz.201  In 
these articles, Schwartz argues that while some structural rules are 
needed for efficient bankruptcy adjudication, the number of manda-
tory rules is greater than that for which the structural explanation 
would account.202  These excess mandatory rules, in turn, lead Ameri-
can firms to choose either bankruptcy systems that fail to fully serve 
the firm’s bankruptcy needs or capital structures that serve the firm’s 
bankruptcy needs but fall short during times when the firm is sol-
vent.203  Given that the ultimate goal of bankruptcy is to reduce capital 
costs by providing for a greater potential return in insolvency, 
Schwartz argues that firms should be able to choose bankruptcy sys-
tems ex ante that maximize return for creditors and allow the firm to 
maintain an optimal capital structure.204  In other words, one can 
more efficiently decide how to deal with a firm before it becomes in-
solvent, rather than afterwards. 
Schwartz, however, has his detractors.  Lynn LoPucki has written 
extensive critiques of his proposals.205  Yet these critiques largely rest 
on how Schwartz deals with the choice between liquidating or reor-
ganizing a firm—a choice, as explained in Part I.B.1, that is irrelevant 
to sovereigns.206  LoPucki concedes that, notwithstanding his ex-
200 See Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts:  An Em-
pirical Examination of Sovereign Bonds, 53 EMORY L.J. 929, 950-51 tbl.2 (2004) (listing law 
firms that handle sovereign debt issuance and finding that experienced law firms are 
often both issuer and investment bank counsel). 
201 Schwartz, A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, supra note 47; Alan 
Schwartz, Bankruptcy Contracting Reviewed, 109 YALE L.J. 343 (1999). 
202 See Schwartz, supra note 47, at 1841 (arguing, for example, that 11 U.S.C. § 
1129(a)(7)(A)(ii) (1994) unnecessarily favors insolvent estates by giving dissenting 
creditors the market value of their claims rather than the “going-concern value”). 
203 See id. at 1811 (describing this “difficult problem”). 
204 See id. at 1814 (“To summarize, in the economic view, the ultimate object of 
bankruptcy law is to help maximize social wealth.  This object implies the instrumental 
goal of minimizing the cost of debt capital.”). 
205 Lynn M. LoPucki, Contract Bankruptcy:  A Reply to Alan Schwartz, 109 YALE L.J. 
317 (1999) [hereinafter LoPucki, Reply I]; Lynn M. LoPucki, Bankruptcy Contracting Re-
vised:  A Reply to Alan Schwartz’s New Model, 109 YALE L.J. 365 (1999) [hereinafter 
LoPucki, Reply II]. 
206 In Schwartz’s model, a firm is “bribed” with a percentage of the insolvency-state 
payoff to creditors in order for it to contractually choose the bankruptcy procedure—
restructuring or liquidation—that would maximize recovery.  The “bribe” is modified 
in subsequent contracts to reflect the current amount necessary to induce a firm to 
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pressed concerns, “Schwartz’s failure to prove bankruptcy contracting 
feasible does not prove it infeasible.  Given the strong preference of 
law and economics scholars for a contract solution to the bankruptcy 
problem, it is inevitable that others will attempt to do what he could 
not.”207  Susan Block-Lieb criticizes the theory of contractual bank-
ruptcy on the ground that it will create “immense decision-making 
costs.”208  However, Block-Lieb’s analysis largely rests on the ground 
that there is another option:  statutory bankruptcy.209  As discussed be-
fore, the option of statutory bankruptcy for sovereigns does not ap-
pear to be politically plausible, and is, moreover, undesirable from the 
point of view of creditors and debtors.210
Thus, the appropriate analysis compares contractual bankruptcy 
to nothing.  As Block-Lieb points out in another article, creditors and 
debtors could easily choose to move towards greater contracting in 
bankruptcy.211  One can see that in the sovereign lending context, 
creditors and debtors have already made this choice through increas-
ing their use of collective action clauses, which themselves are a 
choose the proper contract.  Schwartz, supra note 201, at 346-48.  LoPucki argues that 
Schwartz’s paradigm fails to account for the possibility that debtors may erroneously or 
strategically underestimate the bribe needed to induce the proper choice.  See 
LoPucki, Reply I, supra note 205, at 325, 328-29 (criticizing Schwartz’s proposal to have 
creditors bribe an insolvent firm to choose the most efficient form of bankruptcy and 
arguing that Schwartz fails to address the fact that most junior creditors would prefer 
ill-advised reorganizations to liquidations in which they might recover nothing); 
LoPucki, Reply II, supra note 205, at 376 (“The deus ex machina in this happy drama is 
Schwartz’s assumptions that (1) the debtor firm knows what bankruptcy contract is op-
timal and (2) the debtor firm must offer that contract.”).  This choice, however, would 
be irrelevant in the sovereign context, as creditors would be left only with the option of 
restructuring.  See supra Part I.B.1 (explaining that a sovereign cannot be liquidated). 
207 LoPucki, Reply II, supra note 205, at 379; see also LoPucki, Reply I, supra note 205, 
at 340 (“Schwartz’s failure to deliver a model of bankruptcy contracting that works 
does not mean that such a model is impossible.”). 
208 See Susan Block-Lieb, The Logic and Limits of Contract Bankruptcy, 2001 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 503, 536-55 (noting that external and internal decision-making costs rise when 
considering various contractual bankruptcy models). 
209 See id. at 558-60 (concluding that contractual bankruptcy models may raise 
costs when compared to existing bankruptcy laws).  Block-Lieb herself acknowledges 
that “[m]arket resolution may permit parties to adopt bankruptcy rules to fit their spe-
cific needs, without incurring or imposing unmanageable decision-making costs.”  Id. 
at 560. 
210 See supra text accompanying notes 126-37 (discussing political barriers and 
technical problems with statutory bankruptcy frameworks for sovereigns). 
211 See Block-Lieb, supra note 196, at 95 (arguing that the potential for contractual 
bankruptcy is linked less to politics than the parties’ willingness to contract around ex-
isting bankruptcy provisions). 
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somewhat more limited form of contractual insolvency resolution.212  
Sovereign creditors and debtors should take the next step. 
B.  Why Should Countries Create a DSDRM? 
The DSDRM has two principal advantages.  First, it provides the 
advantages of existing proposals while eliminating their key disadvan-
tages.  In Part II.A, this Comment analyzed the SDRM proposed by the 
IMF and found that it had the advantage of providing a comprehen-
sive solution to the restructuring dilemma:  it resolved the creditor 
coordination problem by providing a single forum in which creditors 
could negotiate the restructuring.213  The SDRM proposal, however, 
has been criticized on a number of fronts-–academic, political, and 
business-–for the additional moral hazard that would be introduced 
into the markets if debtors were allowed to restructure their debts 
without any restrictions.214  The DSDRM provides the option of adopt-
ing a complete or adapted version of the CAC approach, either allow-
ing only creditors to invoke the DSDRM, or allowing debtors to invoke 
the protections in limited circumstances.215  Furthermore, the DSDRM 
approach reduces debtor moral hazard by giving creditors a key role 
in helping to draft the contours of the restructuring mechanism.  
Creditors could ostensibly participate in the drafting of a menu of op-
tions for the DSDRM from which countries would select, and creditors 
could also lobby countries on which specific options to select.  Credi-
tor participation, and thus Wall Street support, should help reduce 
U.S. opposition to the proposal.216  Furthermore, the fact that the IMF 
will no longer play a key role in resolving debt disputes should make 
212 See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text (discussing the increase in the 
usage of collective action clauses in sovereign lending). 
213 See IMF, PROPOSED FEATURES, supra note 149, at 13-16 (discussing various pro-
posals for the organization of creditors and advocating the Sovereign Debt Dispute 
Resolution Forum, which would provide a forum for the resolution of nearly all credi-
tor claims against a debtor country). 
214 See supra notes 159-61 and accompanying text (citing criticisms of the SDRM on 
ground of moral hazard). 
215 See infra Part III.C.1-2 (discussing who may invoke the DSDRM and when they 
may do so). 
216 Cf. Bello, supra note 194, at 1 (“[T]he SDRM was vetoed by US Treasury in the 
interest of US banks.”). 
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the DSDRM more palatable than the SDRM to developing coun-
tries.217
In Part II.B, this Comment analyzed the CAC proposal of the U.S. 
Treasury Department and found that it had the advantage of at least 
partially addressing moral hazard concerns; by allowing only creditors 
to initiate a restructuring after a super-majority vote, debtors would 
not be as tempted to engage in behavior giving rise to the need for a 
restructuring.218  In contrast, the failure to provide for creditor coor-
dination was a key pitfall of the CAC proposal, a point acknowledged 
even by its key supporters.219  The DSDRM, like the SDRM, provides a 
comprehensive solution to the coordination problem; it reduces the 
cost of creditor coordination by having the debtor country spell out, 
ex ante, how creditors will be organized into classes and how they will 
negotiate and vote on a restructuring plan.220
In addition, the DSDRM adopts the CAC approach to jurisdic-
tional questions, allowing each individual country and its future credi-
tors to determine by contract which courts would have jurisdiction 
over disputes concerning the restructuring.221  As noted previously, a 
key concern of countries regarding the SDRM was that it would in-
fringe upon their sovereignty.222  Thus, while it is unlikely that a coun-
try would specify that its own courts would be the dispute resolution  
 
 
 
 
 
 
217 See John H. Chun, Note, “Post-Modern” Sovereign Debt Crisis:  Did Mexico Need an 
International Bankruptcy Forum?, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2647, 2698 (1996) (“[A] signifi-
cant amount of distrust of the IMF exists in the developing world.”). 
218 See supra notes 184-85 (noting that many creditors purchase bonds with CACs 
at yields only slightly higher, if higher at all, than bonds with UACs). 
219 See supra note 189 (citing the Treasury Department’s concession that CACs are 
not well suited for coordination). 
220 See infra Part III.C.4 (outlining a variety of options available for organizing 
creditor classes and restructurings). 
221 See infra note 287 and accompanying text (noting that countries could elect to 
choose a variety of forums to resolve disputes). 
222 See supra note 162 and accompanying text. 
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forum in a DSDRM,223 allowing a country the option to select from 
among court systems may allay concerns regarding sovereignty.224
The second advantage of the DSDRM approach is that it gives the 
market a large role in determining which options work best for debt-
ors and creditors and which might be discarded.  Neither of the other 
existing options would provide this advantage. 
On the one hand, the SDRM, which would be created through an 
amendment to the IMF Articles,225 would allow only one approach to 
debt restructuring:  that specified in the SDRM.  Other variations of 
creditor organization, plan approval, debtor-in-possession financing, 
and creditor stays would necessarily be forsaken in favor of the SDRM 
approach.  While creditors could surely provide ex ante input about 
which variation would work best, once the SDRM was approved by the 
IMF, the markets could only vote “yea” or “nay.”226
The CAC, on the other hand, provides too much flexibility.  Since 
the CAC only allows creditors to amend the payment terms of a bond 
contract,227 the parameters of a proposed restructuring are not set out 
before the restructuring occurs, and thus cannot be evaluated by the 
markets. 
The DSDRM approach, however, differs from the CAC and the 
SDRM approaches in that it allows both parties-–debtors and credi-
tors-–to play a role in crafting a “designer” restructuring mechanism.  
Additionally, the DSDRM provides an ex ante restructuring plan of 
223 One key reason may be that creditors will not be amenable to adjudication of 
disputes in a sovereign’s own courts, which might be subject to influence or corrup-
tion.  See Edgardo Buscaglia & Maria Dakolias, An Analysis of the Causes of Corruption in 
the Judiciary, 30 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 95, 95-97 (arguing that corruption in any form 
can pose a problem for private sector development, and noting that judicial corrup-
tion specifically poses a problem because the judiciary “is supposed to provide an es-
sential check on [corruption] in the other public institutions”); Santiso, supra note 
137, at 16-17 (discussing the need to reduce corruption in legal and judicial systems to 
foster private sector development). 
224 Admittedly, one possible concern with submitting disputes over a CAC to a 
domestic court is that sovereigns would have no incentive to abide by the decision of 
that court.  However, a sovereign which balked at following the decisions of a domestic 
court would ostensibly lose the protections of its DSDRM. 
225 IMF Articles, supra note 167; see Gianviti, supra note 167 (considering the possi-
ble requirement of amending the IMF Articles). 
226 Arguably, creditors and debtors unhappy with the IMF approach could con-
tract around it.  The DSDRM proposed in this Comment is an example of such a con-
tract.  However, efficiency gains from this approach would be doubtful unless there 
was widespread consensus on the IMF approach.  Given the discussion in Part II.B, su-
pra, this seems unlikely. 
227 See supra note 180 and accompanying text (discussing the CAC proposal). 
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which all future investors can be made aware.  Thus, future investors 
would presumably be willing to accept lower rates for debt instru-
ments issued by a country with a DSDRM that they think increase their 
return in insolvency and higher rates for countries with DSDRMs that 
are less likely to provide high returns.  This pattern has been demon-
strated with consumer bankruptcy laws,228 laws on corporate dividend 
distribution,229 and non-payment terms in corporate230 and sovereign 
bonds.231  Thus, the market would likely evaluate the DSDRM by ac-
counting for it in the price of future sovereign bonds.  If these clauses 
are invoked in the future, debtor countries and creditors alike would 
then be able to determine on the basis of this experience which 
clauses will provide greater creditor protection and adjust the price 
(and the terms of future DSDRMs) accordingly.  In this sense, the 
DSDRM could be market rated. 
C.  What Would a DSDRM Look Like? 
Since one of the primary justifications for attempting to provide a 
DSDRM is that such a contract would allow sovereigns and their credi-
tors to tailor restructuring to country-specific situations, it is impossi-
ble to explain exactly what a DSDRM would look like.  As Schwartz 
points out, “[i]n the world of bankruptcy, one size cannot fit all.”232  
Some countries with relatively simple debt profiles may have short and 
simple contracts, while others may need to outline more complex 
procedures.  This subpart will attempt to outline some key options 
that should be included in a DSDRM. 
228 See supra note 114 (citing evidence that states with more liberal bankruptcy pro-
tections for debtors adversely impact provision of credit to the poor). 
229 See Craig A. Peterson & Norman W. Hawker, Does Corporate Law Matter?  Legal 
Capital Restrictions on Stock Distributions, 31 AKRON L. REV. 175, 221-25 (1997) (citing the 
results of empirical research illustrating that investors make decisions based in part on 
corporate law regarding the distribution of dividends). 
230 See Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 125, at 68 (noting that a number of corpora-
tions avoided Chapter 11 by changing the non-payment terms of the bond contract, 
thus making them less valuable and consequently inducing holdout creditors to re-
structure). 
231 See Fisch & Gentile, supra note 5, at 1092 (stating that Pakistan, Ecuador, and 
Uruguay have used exit consents, in which a non-payment term is amended to make a 
bond less valuable so as to induce an exchange). 
232 Schwartz, supra note 47, at 1850. 
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1.  Who Could Invoke the DSDRM? 
Bonds currently using a collective action clause allow only the 
creditors to invoke a restructuring.233  The IMF’s proposed SDRM 
would allow a debtor to invoke a restructuring as well.234  The question 
of who is allowed to invoke a restructuring bears heavily on moral 
hazard.  As discussed previously, one of the major moral hazard con-
cerns of the SDRM was that creditors feared overly frequent debtor 
restructurings.235  Their concern may be well founded:  while there are 
certainly substantial sanctions for sovereigns defaulting on their 
loans,236 a simple look at personal bankruptcy in the United States 
shows that voluntary restructurings are far more common than invol-
untary restructurings.237  Political and social concerns may similarly 
encourage sovereigns to declare a default before their creditors force 
a restructuring.238  Moreover, allowing creditors, and not debtors, to 
initiate restructuring “would help to offset the perception that sover-
eign bankruptcy is too lenient on sovereign debtors.”239
However, there are good arguments in favor of allowing some sort 
of voluntary restructuring.  Sovereigns are probably in a better posi-
tion to foresee internal and external conditions that could lead to a 
default, just as Fred can probably foretell a personal financial crisis be-
fore his banks can.240  Furthermore, delaying a restructuring until 
233 See supra notes 180-85 and accompanying text (discussing the operation of col-
lective action clauses and noting that a majority of creditors, not the debtor, may alter 
a bond’s terms and conditions). 
234 See supra notes 141-46 and accompanying text (summarizing a proposal which 
would allow a debtor to invoke the protections of the SDRM). 
235 See supra note 160 and accompanying text (noting creditors’ concern that 
debtor countries would use the SDRM opportunistically). 
236 See supra note 16 and accompanying text (considering the possible negative 
impact of default upon credit ratings and future ability to borrow). 
237 See John C. McCoid, II, The Origins of Voluntary Bankruptcy, 5 BANKR. DEV. J. 361, 
361 (1988) (“Debtors resort to voluntary bankruptcy far more often than creditors in-
stitute involuntary proceedings against them.”).  The reason that more consumers are 
so inclined to resort to voluntary bankruptcy may be the moral hazard created by pro-
debtor bankruptcy laws in the United States.  See F.H. Buckley & Margaret F. Brinig, 
The Bankruptcy Puzzle, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 187, 192 (1998) (“In a lax legal regime, oppor-
tunistic debtors will petition even though they can repay their creditors; in a more rig-
orous regime, debtors will forgo the bankruptcy option unless their backs are to the 
wall.”). 
238 See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text (noting that sovereigns consider 
social and political concerns in their decision to default). 
239 Bolton & Skeel, supra note 50, at 787. 
240 See Michael Chui et al., Sovereign Liquidity Crises:  Analytics and Implications for 
Public Policy, 26 J. BANKING & FIN. 519, 527 (2002) (“Information about the fundamen-
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creditors are aware of these conditions-–or until a default occurs-–is 
likely to impose additional costs on all parties.241  Additionally, pre-
default restructuring might raise creditor, and hence investor, expec-
tations; if creditors believe that a country is likely to default in the 
near future, they may want to restructure the debt so as to avoid a de-
fault and the resulting decrease in the value of their bonds or loans.242  
Lastly, debtors who seek additional financing because they do not 
have the option to initiate a restructuring may default later, which will 
then decrease returns for prior creditors.243
Thus, a debtor and creditor might have three options:  (1) per-
mitting only a creditor to invoke a restructuring clause; (2) permitting 
both debtors and creditors to invoke a restructuring clause; and (3) 
permitting creditors to invoke a restructuring clause and allowing 
debtors to invoke the clause only under certain conditions or penal-
ties. 
2.  When Could a Debtor Invoke a Restructuring Clause? 
A variety of carrots and sticks could be used to prevent a debtor 
from opportunistically invoking a restructuring clause in a designer 
sovereign debt restructuring mechanism.  Some initial drafts of the 
SDRM required the IMF to certify that a country’s debts were unsus-
tals of an economy is frequently not transparent and creditors are often unsure about 
the information and analysis of other market participants.”); Dickerson, supra note 46, 
at 1005-06 (arguing that sovereigns facing a solvency or liquidity crisis often wait too 
long to restructure, implying that sovereigns sometimes have ex ante knowledge of cri-
sis conditions that could give rise to default). 
241 See INT’L MONETARY FUND, ANNUAL REPORT 2002, at 35 box 3.4 (2002), avail-
able at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/ar/2002/eng/pdf/file2.pdf (“[S]overeigns 
wait too long before seeking a restructuring, leaving both their citizens and creditors 
worse off.”); Dickerson, supra note 46, at 1006 (noting that delaying a restructuring 
leads to increased costs). 
242 See Bratton & Gulati, supra note 17, at 18-19 (discussing pre-default restructur-
ing). 
243 If a debtor is aware that its debt is unsustainable but is still able to access the 
credit markets, it may do so if it cannot voluntarily initiate restructuring.  Assuming 
that a debtor country has x resources to repay y loan obligations, and it can initiate a 
restructuring, then creditors will receive a proportion of their debt equal to x/y.  How-
ever, if the debtor country cannot initiate a restructuring but instead obtains addi-
tional financing z which is not used to repay creditors, the proportion of recovery will 
shrink to (x)/(y+z).  Although some of this risk can be reduced by the use of priority 
rules, allowing a debtor to initiate restructurings would also help.  See Bolton & Skeel, 
supra note 50, at 788-92 (discussing the problem of dilution of recovery by later credi-
tors and the use of absolute priority to address this problem). 
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tainable before allowing a restructuring to occur.244  At least one au-
thor has proposed a “good faith” requirement.245  This requirement, 
however, would not necessarily create certainty; “good faith” is cer-
tainly open to interpretation.246  In addition, using a creditors commit-
tee to make an ex post determination of good faith creates transaction 
costs.  As one author argues: 
A system that leads to a quick, predictable, and orderly restructuring of 
the sovereign’s private and public debt would ultimately reduce the fu-
ture cost of sovereign borrowing, because creditors would receive a 
higher recovery under such a system and this should cause them to de-
crease the cost of sovereign lending.
247
One way to resolve this problem would be to precisely define 
“credit event” or “unsustainable debt” in the DSDRM.  There is a vast 
literature on the economic factors that can be used to determine the 
likelihood of default, including the debt-to-GDP ratio, the primary-
balance-to-GDP ratio, and the level of public expenditures.248  One au-
thor has linked the specific likelihood of default on commercial bank 
debt to “high private arrears relative to total debt, high short-term 
debt and a low proportion of private debt service due being paid.”249  
Ostensibly, these factors could be customized to analyze the debt sus-
tainability of a specific country and determine when creditors would 
gain from restructuring that country’s debt.  Thus, an SDRM could 
limit the ability of debtor countries to default in situations when their 
debt becomes verifiably “unsustainable” as defined in the contract.  
Such definitions could be crafted so as to rely on independently veri-
244 See Dickerson, supra note 46, at 1035 (“An earlier version of the SDRM pre-
vented a sovereign from activating a restructuring unless the IMF certified that its 
debts were unsustainable.”).  However, the IMF might not serve this function well.  See 
Bolton & Skeel, supra note 50, at 792-93 (“[T]he IMF is in a weak position to effectively 
fulfill th[e] role [of imposing financial discipline], as has been argued in many places 
and is widely recognized.”). 
245 See Dickerson, supra note 46, at 1036 (arguing for a good faith standard to be 
adjudicated by a creditors committee). 
246 See Consove v. Cohen (In Re Roco Corp.), 701 F.2d 978, 984 (1st Cir. 1983) 
(“[T]he good faith requirement [in the bankruptcy provision at issue] is not suscepti-
ble of precise definition . . . .”); Robert S. Adler & Richard A. Mann, Good Faith:  A New 
Look at an Old Doctrine, 28 AKRON L. REV. 31, 43-44 (1994) (discussing various interpre-
tations of “good faith”). 
247 Dickerson, supra note 46, at 1011-12. 
248 See Fiess, supra note 32, at 17 (surveying numerous studies that have cited these 
indicators as correlating with country credit ratings). 
249 David McKenzie, An Econometric Analysis of IBRD Creditworthiness 26 (World 
Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 2822, 2002), available at 
http://econ.worldbank.org/files/wps2822.pdf. 
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fiable data, such as that provided by debtor countries to the IMF.250  By 
restricting a debtor country to declaring default only when it is or will 
shortly become unable to repay its obligations, a DSDRM could elimi-
nate the difficulty in deciding when a country is simply unwilling to 
pay.251  The determination of these factors will be tricky, and some ex 
ante negotiation will be needed to ensure the proper balance between 
the rights of creditors and those of debtor nations.252
3.  Would There Be a Stay of Litigation? 
The threat of creditor holdout litigation may implicate the need 
for an automatic stay.  As previously discussed, the creditor holdout 
problem reduces the total amount of assets available to nonholdout 
creditors.253  When holdout creditors use litigation as a bargaining 
tool to increase their returns, it not only reduces the overall base of 
assets, but it can also prove particularly disruptive to restructuring.254  
For these reasons, many authors suggest that an automatic stay on liti-
gation, similar to that available to Fred in Chapter 13 bankruptcy, 
would be necessary to “strengthen[] the overall leverage of credi-
tors.”255  It may also offer some “breathing space to the sovereign 
250 See INT’L MONETARY FUND, ANNUAL REPORT 2004, at 24-26 (2004), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/ar/2004/eng/pdf/file2.pdf (reviewing IMF 
debt sustainability surveillance mechanisms); Gianviti, supra note 167, at 779 (discuss-
ing the IMF data dissemination system).  This use of the IMF as a data provider would 
probably not engender the hostility that the SDRM faced, because the proposed SDRM 
was going to be used primarily as a “bankruptcy court.”  See supra text accompanying 
notes 141-51 (discussing the proposed components of the SDRM); supra notes 161-62 
(identifying debtor country concerns about intrusions on sovereignty). 
251 See Lipworth & Nystedt, supra note 55, at 192 (suggesting that “strategic de-
fault” might occur when a debtor is unwilling to pay, rather than when it is actually in-
solvent). 
252 See id. at 200 (“[T]he balance between creditor and debtor ‘rights’ is a subtle 
one, and great care needs to be taken to not shift the balance too far in either direc-
tion.”). 
253 See supra part I.C.1 (discussing why the creditor holdout problem impedes a 
restructuring). 
254 See supra notes 67-84 (reviewing creditor holdout litigation and its resulting ef-
fects); see also Lipworth & Nystedt, supra note 55, at 202-03 (discussing the “sweeteners” 
that a debtor country would need to offer to persuade creditors to accept a voluntary 
payments suspension).  But see Bratton & Gulati, supra note 17, at 34-35 (arguing that 
countries can structure their transactions to avoid assets being captured in holdout 
litigation). 
255 Stijn Claessens & Leora F. Klapper, Bankruptcy Around the World:  Explanations of 
Its Relative Use 20, (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 2865, 2002), avail-
able at http://econ.worldbank.org/files/wps2865.pdf.  But see Lipworth & Nystedt, su-
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debtor.”256  Some argue that a situation-specific stay on litigation is so 
important that it ought to be a mandatory feature of any bankruptcy 
system.257  Others, however, argue that the relative difficulty in collect-
ing sovereign assets through litigation makes a stay less necessary and 
perhaps more burdensome to a restructuring scheme.258  One com-
mentator notes that even the IMF, in drafting the SDRM, was unsure 
whether an automatic stay on litigation would be beneficial to creditor 
and debtor alike.259  Still others argue for an intermediate road, which 
would allow an automatic stay contingent on the approval of a major-
ity of bondholders.260  In summary, there are three options regarding 
creditor litigation:  (1) no stay, (2) an absolute automatic stay, or (3) a 
limited stay.  The decision to elect one of these options for a DSDRM 
might depend on the extent of assets outside the debtor country, the 
debtor’s perception of the threat of creditor litigation, and the credi-
tors’ perception of a successful renegotiation. 
Similar to the concept of a litigation stay, a country could also 
spell out a planned imposition of temporary capital controls in the 
DSDRM.  Rapid capital flight is a serious problem during a financial 
crisis and often accompanies sovereign debt defaults.261  And there is 
some evidence that risk of a default may accelerate capital flight.262  
Thus, a country could establish temporary capital controls to prevent 
the rapid flight of capital out of the country.  Capital controls either 
directly or indirectly regulate or prohibit cross-border capital transac-
tions.263  One should note that the IMF currently has the power to al-
pra note 55, at 205 (noting that creditors may respond by preferring to lend on a short-
term basis and thus reduce their risk). 
256 Lipworth & Nystedt, supra note 55, at 203. 
257 See Schwartz, supra note 47, at 1840-41 (arguing that a stay is necessary to pre-
vent foreclosure when doing so would maximize the value of the bankrupt estate). 
258 See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 56, at 985 (“The costs of a stay, however, would 
outweigh the[] benefits [of minimizing the collective action problem].”). 
259 See Bolton & Skeel, supra note 50, at 782 n.50 (relying on IMF, FURTHER CON-
SIDERATIONS, supra note 148, to support their argument that the IMF equivocated on 
the potential benefits of an automatic stay). 
260 See id. at 782-83 (arguing for a creditor referendum on a stay); see also David A. 
Skeel, Jr., Can Majority Voting Provisions Do It All?, 52 EMORY L.J. 417, 423 (2003) (dis-
cussing the option of a limited stay). 
261 See Fiess, supra note 32, at 13 (analyzing capital flight after financial crises in 
Latin America and Asia). 
262 See Gianviti, supra note 167, at 778 (discussing the capital flight in Mexico after 
the risk of default became apparent). 
263 See Duncan E. Williams, Note, Policy Perspectives on the Use of Capital Controls in 
Emerging Market Nations:  Lessons From the Asian Financial Crisis and a Look at the Interna-
tional Legal Regime, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 561, 571 (2001) (setting forth the options for 
  
696 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 154: 649 
 
low, or, under certain circumstances, to require the imposition of 
capital controls.264  By showing that it will impose capital controls, 
whether on its own or due to IMF mandate, a debtor country can in-
crease creditor confidence that assets potentially funding a restructur-
ing will remain in-country, and therefore help stem further financial 
crisis.265
4.  How Would Creditor Priority and Voting Be Handled? 
Procedures for creating a plan to restructure a country’s debt will 
be central to a DSDRM.  Current practice with collective action 
clauses simply allows creditors to meet, create a plan, and submit the 
plan to a vote of creditors, a majority or supermajority of which must 
approve it.266  The DSDRM solves three major problems created by 
CACs.  First, a creditor meeting and majority vote become increasingly 
complicated as a country’s debt profile increases in complexity.267  
Second, the plan might undermine absolute priority by according jun-
ior creditors power equal to senior creditors to propose and approve a 
plan.  For example, holders of a recent bond issue could collude with 
banks to create a restructuring plan that would repay these claims be-
fore payment of senior debt or secured claims, such as trade debt.268  
Third, some vulture funds are using pari passu clauses269 for the pur-
capital controls).  For example, under Taiwan’s capital control provision, “foreign in-
vestors must gain approval from Taiwan’s security markets regulatory agency prior to 
making investments in the Taiwanese stock exchange.”  Id. at 573. 
264 See id. at 776 (“[T]he [IMF] may request a member to impose exchange con-
trols on capital movements in order to avoid an excessive use of the [IMF]’s re-
sources.”). 
265 Cf. Gianviti, supra note 167, at 774-75 (discussing the problems that occurred 
after Mexico failed to prevent rapid capital flight during the 1994 crisis). 
266 See supra note 180 and accompanying text. 
267 See Skeel, supra note 260, at 422-23 (“If the sovereign has issued, say, a dozen or 
two separate bonds, holding individual votes on each of the bonds is a much more 
complicated endeavor.”). 
268 This occurred in Ecuador in 1999, when collateralized Brady Bonds, ostensibly 
senior to non-collateralized bonds, were restructured first, leaving junior creditors with 
increased assets to pay their claims.  See Bolton & Skeel, supra note 50, at 775 (noting 
that this “turned the bonds’ ostensible priority scheme on its head”). 
269 A pari passu clause “prevents the borrower from incurring obligations to other 
creditors that rank legally senior to the debt instrument containing the clause.”  Buch-
heit & Pam, supra note 54, at 872.  See also Gelpern, supra note 6, at 1133-34 (reviewing 
the various interpretations given to pari passu clauses by courts). 
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pose of delaying restructuring deals where some creditors would get 
paid in advance of others, thus undermining creditor priority.270
Consequently, it might be helpful to identify classes of debt.  Clas-
sification of claims exists in personal bankruptcy in the United States; 
Fred’s restructuring plan might separate his bank, his credit card 
company, and his personal creditors into separate classes for the pur-
pose of repayment under a plan.271  Likewise, a DSDRM could identify 
possible classes of debt that a country could incur and rank them ac-
cording to seniority.  Some authors have argued that ranking creditors 
in declining order based on how recently they have lent to the debtor 
country would be an effective way to stem overborrowing.272  The ra-
tionale is that creditors will be less likely to lend to an overextended 
sovereign if they know that their debt will be ranked lower in a poten-
tial restructuring.273  Other commentators, however, have argued that 
this type of priority ranking would discourage even sensible financing 
of countries with large debt burdens and would encourage countries 
to borrow even more heavily during prosperous economic times.274
Another means of prioritizing claims would be to give higher pri-
ority to creditors who made sustainable loans to a sovereign and lower 
priority to those who lent after debt became unsustainable,275 as would 
270 See Buchheit & Pam, supra note 54, at 880-83 (finding that vulture funds have 
derailed restructurings where their debt was repaid in a manner than ranked them 
junior to other debt).  Given the instability in the jurisprudence, a DSDRM would pro-
vide an extra veneer of certainty ex ante by establishing priority and eliminating pari 
passu clauses. 
271 See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(1) (2000) (the restructuring plan “may designate a class 
or classes of unsecured claims”).  A claim can be put in a class only if it is “substantially 
similar” to the other claims in the class.  11 U.S.C. § 1122(a). 
272 See Bolton & Skeel, supra note 50, at 800-01 (analyzing a first-in-time priority 
system). 
273 See id. at 788-92 (discussing the debt dilution that may result if a first-in-time 
absolute priority system is not established). 
274 See, e.g., Gelpern, supra note 6, at 1145-46 (criticizing a first-in-time priority 
ranking system). 
275 Of course, it is likely that the IMF and other official creditors would comprise a 
separate creditor class with high priority.  In part, this is because the Paris Club (the 
restructuring group for official bilateral creditors) mandates a comparability treatment 
assumption, which requires that other restructurings be on terms no more favorable as 
those offered by the Paris Club.  Seveg, supra note 46, at 40-41.  As such, Paris Club 
debtors are unlikely to agree to a restructuring which would accord them lower prior-
ity in payment, and thus terms less favorable than those offered to other creditors.  Id.; 
see also Magnus Saxegaard, Comment, Creditor Participation in the HIPC Debt Relief Initia-
tives:  The Case of Guyana, 32 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 725, 729 (2004) (explaining that 
Guyana was forestalled from settling with a disgruntled creditor because of the compa-
rability treatment assumption). 
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be defined by means discussed above at Part III.C.2.  This would pro-
vide an ex ante signal to potential creditors as to how they are likely to 
get repaid in the event of a default.276  This task is not without its diffi-
culties, however.  Governments borrow through different forms and at 
different times, and identifying priority for the foreseeable future may 
not be an easy task.277  Nevertheless, pre-default classifications have 
been used with states and municipalities in the United States.278  Thus, 
debtor countries would be able to elect from one of many options for 
determining creditor priority and organizing creditor classes. 
Creation of a plan could be effected by ad hoc meetings which in-
volve all creditors or a creditors committee, with representatives 
elected from each class.279  Alternatively, the DSDRM could use a trus-
tee to work with creditors in creating a restructuring plan.  The “su-
per-trustee” would consult with the various creditor classes to create a 
plan that the trustee believes would win approval and would be in the 
best interests of creditors.280  The plan, as Bolton and Skeel propose, 
could include some form of debt reduction and restructuring of pay-
ments.281
The plan would then be submitted by the super-trustee to a vote 
of creditors.  The process for approval has been debated in the aca-
demic literature.  One commentator has proposed that a supermajor-
ity requirement would be sufficient to address both creditor holdouts 
and moral hazard issues.282  Others have proposed supermajority votes 
within classes, but unanimity among the classes.283
276 See Gelpern, supra note 6, at 1117 (“A priority structure that is beyond borrower 
discretion, clear ex ante, and enforceable ex post, gives creditors a good sense of 
where they stand relative to one another.”). 
277 See id. 1117-18 (noting the difficulty in establishing an ex ante priority system). 
278 See id. at 1123-24 (noting that California’s constitution and bond documenta-
tion set out the priority treatment for creditors in the event of default). 
279 See Ahdieh, supra note 173, at 756 (finding that there is a need to develop “a 
norm on the use of bondholder committees”); Bolton & Skeel, supra note 50, at 772-73 
(endorsing a mechanism to coordinate reorganizations that is similar to supercommit-
tees in equity receiverships).  But see Schwarcz, supra note 56, at 1002 (insisting that 
creditors committees would be undesirable in the sovereign context because of in-
creased administrative costs). 
280 See Bratton & Gulati, supra note 17, at 46 (proposing the use of “super-trustees” 
to solve collective action problems in sovereign debt restructurings). 
281 See Bolton & Skeel, supra note 50, at 796-97 (proposing a plan that would bal-
ance creditor and debtor interests and strictly prioritize classes of claims). 
282 See Schwarcz, supra note 56, at 1005-06 (advocating a supermajority require-
ment). 
283 See Bolton & Skeel, supra note 50, at 794 (arguing that “veto power of each class 
over the proposed restructuring plan” is necessary to maintain priority). 
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There are a couple of options if the requisite number of creditors 
fail to approve the plan.  One would be to simply have the parties re-
negotiate.  The other would involve a “cramdown procedure,”284 
which essentially forces an agreement on the parties.  A cramdown 
procedure would require an adjudicatory authority to determine that 
the plan was in the best interests of creditors, as in Chapter 9 munici-
pal bankruptcy in the United States,285 or as in Fred’s Chapter 13 
bankruptcy plan.286  This adjudicatory authority–-a judge or arbitral 
panel,287 for example-–would be specified in the DSDRM.  As with pri-
ority structures, a variety of options could be offered to debtors for the 
design of the adjudicator of the cramdown procedure. 
5.  Debtor-In-Possession Financing 
Debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing is relevant in the sovereign 
context both because of the need to provide financing when a sover-
eign has declared a default and the method to determine the priority 
with which the financing will be treated subsequently.  One might 
analogize DIP financing in the sovereign context to social insurance 
programs such as unemployment insurance, which may be utilized by 
families undergoing personal bankruptcy to bridge the financing gap 
while they reorganize.288  Just as Fred could avail himself of the bene-
284 See id. at 795 (suggesting that a cramdown provision is essential to creating a 
successful sovereign debt restructuring plan).  But see Schwarcz, supra note 56, at 1008 
(“[T]he threat of invoking cramdown would lack credibility, and creditors would have 
little incentive to reach a consensual plan solely to avoid that threat.”). 
285 See Bratton & Gulati, supra note 17, at 38-39 (analyzing the “best interests of 
creditors” standard of Chapter 9). 
286 See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(1), (3) (2000) (allowing a court to approve a personal 
bankruptcy plan that is offered in good faith and complies with other statutory re-
quirements). 
287 These arbitral panels could ostensibly include existing international panels 
such as the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).  See 
generally Ibrahim F.A. Shihata, The Settlement of Disputes Regarding Foreign Investment:  The 
Role of the World Bank, with Particular Reference to ICSID and MIGA, 1 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & 
POL’Y 97 (1986) (commenting on the use of ICSID to resolve disputes). 
288 See Adam Feibelman, Defining the Social Insurance Function of Consumer Bank-
ruptcy, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 129, 158 (2005) (noting that bankruptcy and un-
employment insurance both provide a “wage insurance function” that allows a debtor 
to “retain new income” received after unemployment).  DIP financing is also a key part 
of corporate bankruptcy.  See Bolton & Skeel, supra note 50, at 802 (“For corporate 
debtors, access to interim financing is a crucial determinant of the outcome of the re-
structuring process.”).  See generally Bruce A. Henoch, Comment, Postpetition Financing:  
Is There Life After Debt?, 8 BANKR. DEV. J. 575 (1991) (discussing the need for and the 
means of providing post-petition financing for debtors). 
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fits of unemployment insurance while trying to weather a personal 
bankruptcy crisis, countries may need temporary financing to weather 
a financial crisis. 
Thus, a DSDRM could provide an ex ante arrangement for DIP fi-
nancing, either by a specified bank or by arranging for pre-default 
creditor consent.  The inclusion of DIP financing might also have the 
positive benefit of reducing the need for IMF lending into arrears.289  
In addition, the financing could be accorded high priority so that it 
does not go to financing existing debt on which the country has de-
faulted.290  If so desired, creditors could vote on whether or not to au-
thorize this financing.291
D.  How Could a DSDRM Be Created? 
Going forward, a DSDRM could simply be inserted into future 
sovereign debt contracts.  Although the DSDRM is likely to be compli-
cated, existing debt contract documentation already covers a wide 
range of terms and conditions,292 so the additional burden is not likely 
to be great.  Furthermore, many contracts already include sophisti-
cated contract language dealing with political and financial risks.293  
289 See Bolton & Skeel, supra note 50, at 806 (suggesting that providing DIP financ-
ing might avoid wasteful bailouts by the IMF); Bratton & Gulati, supra note 17, at 33 
(arguing that reducing the IMF’s role in the sovereign debt restructuring process 
would be beneficial because IMF participation can shift power away from creditors).  
Reducing the role of the IMF and other government entities in restructuring would 
also result in fewer debtor countries and creditors sharing the perception that “invest-
ment decisions hang on the understanding that [a] foreign government is viewed with 
favor by the White House, Downing Street, and beyond . . . [and that it] will be rescued 
on strategic grounds, despite the cause of [its] woes, the merits of [its] reaction plan, 
or the availability of legal recourse.”  Porzecanski, supra note 97, at 43-44. 
290 See Bolton & Skeel, supra note 50, at 802-03 (arguing that high priority should 
be accorded to post-default financing).  The high priority accorded to such DIP fi-
nancing would have to be an exception to restrictions placed by a sovereign on its abil-
ity to voluntary invoke its DSDRM as described in Part III.C.2. 
291 See id. at 805 (supporting a proposal that would allow creditors to vote on post-
default financing partly on the grounds that “some of the larger institutional creditors 
will be better informed about the debtor’s financial position and political con-
straints”). 
292 See id. at 819 (“[T]he pricing of sovereign debt is already complex and nation-
specific; it is unlikely that a tailored SDRM would add significantly to this complex-
ity.”); see also WOOD, supra note 173, at 15-89, 135-43 (listing the various and often 
complex terms and conditions in term loans and in bonds). 
293 See, e.g., Haque & Burdescu, supra note 13, at 253-54 (discussing political risk 
insurance contracts). 
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Some law firms have begun to envision such clauses,294 and there are 
indications that inklings of DSDRMs are beginning to appear in bond 
documentation.295  The future use of DSDRMs in loan documentation, 
however, may be slow in coming, and until there is widespread ex-
perience with more reduced forms of contractual debt restructuring, 
DSDRMs are unlikely to be popular.296  This is particularly true for 
bonds, which are heavily dependent on standardization for the pur-
pose of trading, and, more significantly, for sovereign debt, which re-
quires a liquid market.297  In addition, greater diversity among debt 
contracts may increase risk premiums charged to borrowers.298  Fi-
nally, there is some evidence that there will be hesitation to accept 
such contracts until they have been interpreted by courts.299
Given that allowing countries and their creditors to draft contracts 
that are overly diverse might result in higher risk premiums, a sub-
stantial degree of standardization would be necessary.  One potential 
solution would be to allow the IMF, the Emerging Markets Traders As-
sociation, or another organization to draft a model law with a menu of 
possible options.300  Allowing creditors to play a significant role in the 
294 See, e.g., Debevoise, supra note 124, at 52 (“Engagement clauses basically de-
scribe a debt restructuring process.  They would specify how the creditors would be 
represented, what data the sovereign must provide to the creditors’ representative and 
by when.”).  Debevoise is a partner at Arnold & Porter.  Id. at 54. 
295 See Ahdieh, supra note 173, at 709 (noting the appearance of a “super-CAC,” 
which is an aggregated voting provision, in a bond); Buchheit & Pam, supra note 54, at 
916 (discussing a Philippine bond offering that provides that the government “will not 
create any preference or priority in respect of any External Public Indebtedness pursu-
ant to [the Philippines Civil Code] unless amounts payable under the Bonds are 
granted preference or priority equally and ratably therewith” (quoting Prospectus, 
U.S.$500,000,000 Republic of the Philippines 8.875% Bonds Due 2008, at 71 (Apr. 2, 
1998))). 
296 See Choi & Gulati, supra note 200, at 937-38 (arguing that financial innovation 
arrives slowly and in stages before widespread use). 
297 See Ahdieh, supra note 173, at 715 (“Given the greater likelihood of sovereign 
default, the tradability of a sovereign bond is necessarily more important.”). 
298 See, e.g., id. at 714 (noting that standardization helps to reduce risk premiums); 
see also Dickerson, supra note 46, at 1027 (suggesting that requiring consistency in 
some aspects of restructuring “should remove some of the uncertainties associated 
with . . . restructurings”). 
299 Cf. Ahdieh, supra note 173, at 717 (finding that judicial interpretation of con-
tracts might have aided the spread of CACs in New York bonds by reducing uncertainty 
about contract terms). 
300 Such standardization would ostensibly reduce some of the advantage of having 
a restructuring plan individually tailored to each country’s needs.  Thus, the envi-
sioned standardization would be more akin to a menu or a “fill-in-the-blanks” contract 
than a complete standardization of terms and conditions.  See Rasmussen, supra note 1, 
at 66 (“The solution to both the transaction-cost problem and the strategic-action 
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drafting of such a “model” would ostensibly reduce resistance to it in 
the creditor community. 
However, there is already a lot of existing sovereign debt301 that 
will not benefit from the inclusion of DSDRMs in future contracts.  A 
sovereign might address this by amending its existing debt contracts 
to include a DSDRM, a plan that would necessarily entail extensive 
negotiations with all creditors, use of exchange offers or exit consents, 
and increased cost.302  Thus, one might argue that some sort of unilat-
eral action is necessary.  Some authors who support contractual bank-
ruptcy for corporations call for debt restructuring procedures to be 
included in corporate charters.303  This theory has been extended to 
the world of sovereign debt, where one author has proposed setting 
forth debt priorities in a debt restructuring protocol.304  Sovereigns 
who opt for this choice, however, would have to be careful to protect 
such a protocol from the whims of future political leaders.  As Ras-
mussen points out, if a sovereign debt protocol were to be amended 
after it was issued, “[t]he benefit that a firm receives from committing 
to a bankruptcy option . . . would evaporate because the commitment 
would not be credible.”305  This is not to say that such a protocol 
should never be amended, but rather that it should be amended only 
rarely and with careful creditor consultation. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the DSDRM might appear to be a radical proposal at 
first glance, it actually represents an incrementalist approach.  CACs 
already represent a foray, if only a slight one, into the world of con-
problem is to have a menu of bankruptcy options available.”).  Over time, market-
testing would likely reveal the best “menu” of options. 
301 See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2005:  A BETTER INVESTMENT 
CLIMATE FOR EVERYONE 263 tbl.4 (2004), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org 
(Report No. 28829) (listing the total debt for low and middle income countries at over 
$2.3 trillion). 
302 See Dickerson, supra note 46, at 1016 (finding that such a process would be 
“time-consuming and could be extremely costly”). 
303 See Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 55 (arguing that including bankruptcy informa-
tion in a company’s corporate charter would “eliminate the potential for future expro-
priation of wealth from creditors to shareholders”).  But see Schwartz, supra note 47, at 
1811 (speculating that such provisions will not preserve enough flexibility). 
304 See Dickerson, supra note 46, at 1027 (“[P]ermitting sovereigns to customize 
their debt restructuring procedures ( just as parties involved in transnational insol-
vency proceedings do by using protocols), will more effectively resolve sovereign debt 
crises . . . .”). 
305 Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 117. 
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tracting for bankruptcy.  The DSDRM would simply expand on CACs 
by adding additional procedures to a majority vote on restructuring.  
Such an incremental approach is likely to appeal to investors.306  Fur-
thermore, the DSDRM provides greater certainty for both the debtor 
country and creditors as to what will happen during a restructuring.  
As one commentator argues: 
In the corner of every room in which the terms of sovereign debt con-
tracts are negotiated and considered sits the 800-pound gorilla of poten-
tial debt restructuring.  The sovereign bond contract—by which nation-
states receive an influx of investment for national growth and develop-
ment, in exchange for a stream of principal and interest payments—is 
one designed with a strong premonition of breach.  Yet the international 
financial order lacks any effective cage for its gorilla.
307
The current reality of sovereign lending is that creditors and 
debtors both implicitly take into account what could happen during a 
default, but neither actually provides for it in their contracts.  This 
remaining uncertainty probably leads to increases in interest rates.308  
Recent restructurings show that uncertainty regarding restructuring 
has altered credit ratings and raised the cost of issuing debt globally 
for both healthy and unhealthy economies.309  Furthermore, various 
strategies to affect ad hoc restructurings, such as exit consents, have 
undermined previous assumptions of priority, something that is likely 
to alienate investors further.310  Lastly, sovereign debt structures are 
becoming larger and more complicated, meaning that the applicabil-
ity of current solutions is likely to erode further.311  A DSDRM, by pro-
306 See Tarullo, supra note 5, at 671-72 (arguing that an incrementalist approach to 
restructurings would be best because of effects on reputation and credibility). 
307 Ahdieh, supra note 173, at 693-94. 
308 Cf. Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 57 (noting that investors consider a bankruptcy 
regime before lending, thus impacting interest rates). 
309 See Gelpern, supra note 6, at 1129 (discussing Pakistan’s restructuring and the 
resulting effects on the market). 
310 See Bolton & Skeel, supra note 50, at 766-67 (highlighting the problems Ecua-
dor faced during a restructuring because its priorities had changed); see also Gelpern, 
supra note 6, at 1152-53 (noting that unlike Argentina, which leaves investors in the 
dark regarding priority, California specifies its priorities before a creditor lends). 
311 See Boeri, supra note 161, at 245 (discussing Argentina’s $141 billion default in 
2001, the largest in history); Gelpern, supra note 6, at 1137 (noting that both domestic 
debt and international debt have become more widely held and that lines between the 
two have blurred, thus complicating bankruptcy matters).  Restructurings, until rela-
tively recently, were simply not this difficult.  See, e.g., A.I. Credit Corp. v. Gov’t of Ja-
maica, 666 F. Supp. 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (quickly resolving a dispute over Jamaica’s 
1987 restructuring through summary judgment). 
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viding a contractual framework, provides some flexibility for thinking 
about future crises. 
In conclusion, the problems shared by personal debtors and sov-
ereigns-–creditor holdout, moral hazard, and lack of coordination 
-–are not insurmountable.  Various restructuring schemes, such as the 
IMF proposal for the SDRM or including CACs in New York-issued 
bonds, have been proposed to address these problems.  Both, how-
ever, fall short.  The SDRM fails to address debtor moral hazard, while 
CACs cannot fully address lack of coordination.  A third, more com-
prehensive solution would be to combine many of the positive attrib-
utes of the SDRM and the market-based contractual solution of CACs.  
The result would be a designer sovereign debt restructuring mecha-
nism, which would provide comprehensive procedures for restructur-
ing a sovereign’s debt.  Such a DSDRM could be effected at first by a 
unilaterally issued “protocol” and subsequently by inclusion in debt 
instrument documentation.  The DSDRM would provide more secu-
rity for creditors, who would know ex ante their rights in default, and 
would lower costs for sovereigns, who would no longer flounder in the 
wake of a financial crisis.  Ultimately, a DSDRM’s most important im-
pact will be on the populations of debtor countries, who may finally 
begin to enjoy the economic stability and prosperity that they so des-
perately need. 
 
